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U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS KNOWLEDGES AND SKILLS
REQUIRED TO PERFORM DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A Thesis Presented to the
W. Page Pitt School of Journalism
and Mass Communications
at Marshall University

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by
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Captain Roger G. Meyer

Introduction

Background of the Problem

With the end of the "Cold War" and public calls for a "peace dividend," the mission of the United States armed forces is changing. Members of Congress, the media, the public and others want the military to become more involved in domestic support.

Since early in the history of the United States, the U.S. military has been involved in domestic support operations. The U.S. Army has played an active role in defending frontier settlers against hostile natives, quelling draft riots during the Civil War, reconstructing the South, fighting outbreaks of disease, and helping countless civilians during floods, tornadoes, storms, hurricanes, and fires.

The Army recently has undertaken more of these operations. Hurricane relief efforts in Florida and Hawaii, riot control in Los Angeles, and humanitarian service missions are but a few examples. Each event required a different response.

However, the biggest challenge facing the Army command is to mold elements of a warfighting military force into a peacetime support organization. The military must gain and maintain public acceptance, understanding and support for these operations.

The Army's Office of the Chief of Public Affairs has overall responsibility for the Army's public affairs mission. Army public affairs is primarily a planned effort to strengthen the Army's deterrence and warfighting powers by timely, accurate and truthful communication about the Army to soldiers, their families, and to U.S. and foreign publics. Effective public affairs efforts produce motivated soldiers and support from the American public, while deterring potential enemies (USDA, OCPA FM 46-1, 1-1).

In late 1992, the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs responded to this new emphasis on domestic support in the Army Communication Strategy.

The strategy consists of five major public affairs campaigns. The "Peacetime Engagement" campaign, renamed "Partners in Freedom," is designed to communicate the Army's involvement in domestic support. Its message is that the "Total Army is committed to serving America and to helping the nation solve some of its most difficult and complex problems" (Cook 10).

The "Total Army" consists of all Army components -- active duty (including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), Army Reserve, and National Guard. It includes military and Department of the Army civilian personnel.

Statement of the Problem

Are the Army's public affairs officers adequately prepared to undertake these emerging operations?

Army public affairs officers are military officers or equivalent Army civilians whose primary duties and responsibilities involve public affairs. They serve in all Army components.

Public affairs officers currently receive 10 weeks of comprehensive public affairs training when they attend the "Public Affairs Officer Course" at the Department of Defense, Defense Information School.

Only two hours of instruction are dedicated to "civil preparedness." This equates to domestic support. Does this course and other courses provide public affairs officers the knowledges and skills necessary to conduct public affairs during domestic support operations?

Knowledge is "The fact or condition of being aware of something; act or state of understanding; practical skill or familiarity gained by actual experience (or training); something that is or may be known" (USDA, OCPA "Professional Development" 9).

Skill is "acquired and developed ability to perform a compilation of individual tasks to a refined level of competence; learned power of doing something competently; ability to use knowledge effectively; technical proficiency" (9).

Army training developers must know the necessary knowledges and skills Army public affairs officers should possess to adequately perform their duties during Army domestic support operations. Once these knowledges and skills are identified, training developers can compare them to the current program of instruction and lesson plan and make the necessary modifications. Without this basic information, they cannot produce reality-based instruction.

Research Questions

Military involvement in domestic support operations lends itself to countless questions and hypotheses. Not the least of these is the controversial political question of how involved should the military be in civilian matters. What is enough or too much?

Such public policy questions are best answered by elected representatives and other elements in American society. In any case, the Army is the servant of the public will.

This research is based on the premise that the Army will play a more active role in domestic support operations -- as recent history and political rumblings indicate.

It seeks to assist Army training developers by providing the basic information they need to produce reality-based public affairs training in domestic support.

The research employed a mail survey of Army public affairs officers who have experience in providing public affairs support to Army domestic support operations.

It sought answers to the following questions:

1. What are the most important public affairs knowledges Army public affairs officers require to provide public affairs support to Army domestic support operations?

2. What are the most important public affairs skills Army public affairs officers require to provide public affairs support to Army domestic support operations?

3. Do Army public affairs officers from the various Army components require different knowledges and skills training emphasis to provide public affairs support to Army domestic support operations?

4. Do Army public affairs officers require different public affairs knowledges and skills to provide public affairs support to each of the four primary categories of domestic support operations?

Assumptions and Limitations

Assumptions were: (1) the Army could provide a listing of an adequate number of public affairs officers to make a census survey possible; (2) public affairs officers would be willing and able to complete the survey based upon their first-hand experience in conducting public affairs support to domestic support operations; (3) knowledges and skills identified by the public affairs officers during various domestic support operations would apply to other domestic support operations; and (4) the knowledge gained through this research would be applied by the Army to future training of public affairs officers.

Limitations included those connected with the use of a mail survey. These included: (1) inability of respondents to recall information; (2) prestige bias; (3) purposeful deception; (4) respondents' curiosity; (5) simplicity and potential inadequacy of the questionnaire; (6) length of time required for data collection; (7) lack of positive identification of the respondents; (8) bias potential; and (9) typically low return rate (Wimmer 132-3).

Also, this research only surveyed Army military officers and equivalent civilians. People who were involved with other agencies during domestic support operations may have provided additional useful information--their responses were beyond the scope of this study.

Literature Review

Background

By the 1990s, national leaders pondered the United States' financial difficulties and economic woes. The defense budget was targeted for heavy cuts as the "Cold War" was over. The funds were shifted from defense to bolster other national priorities. The Army was "downsized."

Meanwhile, politicians and military leaders were challenged to consider and justify the maintenance of a substantial military force. As the sole "superpower," the United States required a smaller and more mobile military force as a deterrent to worldwide aggression. Few doubted the need for a military that could rapidly respond to crisis situations around the world, but these crises were not always armed conflicts.

The U.S. military became more involved with international missions under the auspices of the United Nations. These "peace missions" were designed to assure stability in a troubled world. Operations "Provide Comfort" in Turkey, "Provide Hope" in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and "Provide Promise" in Yugoslavia were some of the larger humanitarian missions conducted in 1991 and 1992.

In 1992, President-elect Clinton stated: "No American foreign policy can succeed if it neglects our domestic

needs; America cannot be strong abroad unless we rebuild our strength at home." U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, D-Ga., Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said, "I believe that the end of the Cold War has created an expanded opportunity for cooperation between military and civilian authorities to address some of our pressing national needs" (Theis 5).

Therefore, the U.S. military stepped up its involvement in domestic support missions.

History. The armed forces have been involved in domestic support almost since the beginning of our nation's history. From defending frontier settlers and quelling draft riots to helping countless civilians during natural and man-made disasters, the U.S. Army has played an active role throughout the centuries.

Direct Army involvement in relief operations got its start during the Civil War. Humanitarian operations, including firefighting, operation of hospitals, and the provision of food and supplies for affected civilian populations both accompanied and followed battles (Rosenfeld 7-8).

After the war, the Army was involved in the reconstruction effort and in westward expansion. "Prior to World War I, the Army Medical Corps was instrumental in controlling malaria, smallpox and yellow fever during construction of the Panama Canal" (Theis 3).

Additional domestic support missions included: Army protection of national parks prior to the establishment of the National Park Service, large-scale flood relief prior to World War II, cleanup and provisioning after a chemical explosion in Texas (1947), support after Hawaiian volcanic eruptions (1955), search and rescue operations in the Grand Canyon following the collision of two airliners (1956), enforcement of court-ordered school integration (1956, 1962), and riot control in various states in the mid to late 1960s (Rosenfeld 9 and USDA, OCPA "History" 12).

In 1971,

the Secretary of Defense formally delegated the authority to the Secretary of the Army to act as the Department of Defense's executive agent for military support to civil authorities...the Army is responsible for coordinating the military response for all (military) services...to emergencies within the United States and in all our territories and possessions (Shannon 3).

Numerous winter storms, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, forest fires and floods occupied the Army support effort in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1990, the Army became officially involved in counternarcotics support to civilian law enforcement authorities. By 1993, the Army was also heavily engaged in environmental matters.

Recent Major Domestic Support Operations. The most notable natural disasters, domestic emergencies and civil disturbance operations included the following:

Hurricane Hugo struck the U.S. mainland on September 22, 1989. Twenty-eight people died, and the storm was the costliest ever to hit the U.S. mainland. The South Carolina National Guard and numerous other Army elements assisted in the clean up and recovery actions (Hugo 1136).

The Loma Prieta Earthquake shook California on October 17, 1989. The quake measured 7.1 on the Richter scale of ground motion and left more than 60 dead and several thousand injured. Most of the devastation occurred in the San Francisco Bay area. It was the fifth strongest earthquake to hit the United States mainland in the century (Chronology 1991 41).

On April 29, 1992, rioting broke out in South-Central Los Angeles, California. This resulted from the acquittal of four LA police officers accused of beating a motorist. Law enforcement agencies were paralyzed. Fifty-two people were killed and damages reached \$1 billion. Eleven thousand National Guard and 4,500 Army and Marine Corps troops were activated to restore order (Chronology 1993 57-58).

Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki struck Florida/Louisiana and Hawaii respectively in August and September 1992. Andrew became the costliest storm in U.S. history and claimed 14

lives. "Iniki (was) the worst hurricane to hit the Hawaiian islands in this century" (Fitzgerald 11). Thousands of National Guard and active duty military personnel were deployed to provide disaster relief (Hurricane Andrew 1010).

Army support was again activated in March 1993 when a deadly winter storm paralyzed the eastern U.S. The Blizzard of '93 was the most widespread winter storm in 105 years. More than 100 people died (Early 4-5).

In April, 1993, 600 National Guard troops were mobilized and 3,000 were placed on alert. Their mission was to ensure the peace after the second trial of the police officers accused of beating a motorist in Los Angeles. Fortunately, this time the troops were not needed (Anderson 28-29).

Beginning in June, 1993, severe flooding in the Midwest caused more than 45 deaths and more than \$10 billion in damage. Army National Guard troops and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provided the backbone of the relief effort.

Routine Domestic Support. America's periodicals were replete with articles and photographs of military personnel engaged in the larger support missions. Without notoriety, local Army community assistance continued throughout this time and has been an integral element in domestic support. These missions encompass support to local physical and social infrastructures (USDA, USAWC "Alternative" 5).

Routine community relations activities such as "adopt-a-school" programs, making Army equipment and facilities available to the community, Army speakers bureau programs, and color guard support to community events continue as the traditional forms of community assistance.

Importance of Army Involvement. Many consider domestic support missions as a primary mission of the military. Army Colonel Philip A. Brehm and Major Wilbur E. Gray wrote:

Only since World War II has the Army been perceived as essentially a combat force, required only to defeat and destroy our enemies in armed conflict. In fact, the Army has a long legacy, both at home and abroad, of peacetime missions (4).

The Army consists of many components and civilians as well as military personnel. Reserve components (U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers form the basis for most domestic support missions.

Active duty Army personnel conduct routine community relations and serve as a backup to other components when needed.

To understand the scope of the Army's humanitarian and disaster service to the nation, consider the events of just one week, 23 September to 7 October 1992. During that period, 16,485 soldiers were cleaning up southern Florida in the wake of

Hurricane Andrew; 1,417 soldiers were doing similar work in Hawaii following Hurricane Iniki; 161 Guam Army National Guard soldiers were at work in Guam following Typhoon Omar; 72 California and 58 Idaho National Guard soldiers were supporting firefighters in five locations; 62 North Carolina National Guard soldiers were moving a convoy of relief supplies to Florida; 23 Wisconsin National Guard soldiers were performing search and rescue and road clearing following tornadoes; two New Mexico National Guard soldiers were providing water to an elementary school with a contaminated well; and a group of Rhode Island National Guard soldiers were providing water to the Pawtucket area where a sewage leak had contaminated the water supply (USDA, OCPA "Disaster" 2).

Citing the military's successful responsiveness during Hurricane Andrew, politicians and the media called for more military involvement in domestic affairs. Senator Nunn even suggested making "FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency*) part of the Department of Defense" (Maze 26).

* FEMA: Executive order 12148, July 20, 1979, established FEMA as the primary coordinating agency for federal emergency management.

Maj. Gen. Charles W. McClain Jr. Army chief of public affairs wrote, "There is no question that as a community we have been spending a great amount of time under such circumstances...the trick is to learn from the past" (McClain 2).

The Army Adapts to Domestic Support

Operations. In June 1993, the Department of the Army released its updated and revised field manual -- FM 100-5, Operations. The manual delineates the Army's operational doctrine -- the standard framework. It explains how and why Army personnel should conduct their duties and tasks.

To emphasize the increased importance of the Army's involvement in domestic support operations, a separate chapter addresses "operations other than war." It outlines principles that guide Army actions in domestic support operations.

These principles include:

- (1) Objective -- direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.
- (2) Unity of effort -- seek unity of effort toward every objective.
- (3) Legitimacy -- sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
- (4) Perseverance -- prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

(5) Restraint -- apply appropriate military capability prudently.

(6) Security -- never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage (13-3-4).

It also identifies Army activities considered operations other than war. They include: noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids (Chapt. 13).

Domestic Support Operations. That same year, the Army developed another key field manual to address the Army's role in domestic support missions--FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations. The manual builds upon the framework introduced in FM 100-5, Operations.

The comprehensive manual serves as a guide and provides general information regarding Army involvement in domestic support missions.

It defines the common characteristic of domestic support operations as

using Army human and physical resources to enhance the national security, thus contributing to the

nation's overall well-being. These operations, which usually draw extensive media attention, require that public affairs implications be considered....The Army's overarching goal is to use its assets prudently for domestic support...and provide a significant benefit for the nation (1-5).

"The National Guard, in a state or territorial status, has primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local civil authorities" (1-1).

The active component (active-duty Army) enters domestic emergency situations only when requested. "When the state and National Guard resources require supplementation and when requested by the governor, the Army will, at the direction of the National Command Authority, assist civil authorities" (1-5).

The manual divides domestic support into four primary categories: disaster and domestic emergency assistance, environmental assistance, law enforcement support, and community assistance.

Disaster and domestic emergencies include natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, or floods and man-made disasters such as hazardous chemical spills, radiological accidents, or massive power disruptions. The category also includes domestic emergencies such as civil defense, mass immigration emergency support, environmental

disaster assistance and other missions such as providing U.S. mail service and air traffic control (Chapt. 5).

Environmental missions encompass compliance, restoration, prevention and conservation. They include activities such as providing technical support to local communities, correcting oil and hazardous material spills, administering the national wetlands protection program, environmental research and development, wildlife conservation, disposal of hazardous materials and wastes, environmental support to state and federal agencies, community recycling programs, wildland firefighting operations, animal disease eradication, and preservation of cultural resources (Chapt. 6).

Missions in support of law enforcement include counterdrug operations, civil disturbance operations, support for combating terrorism, explosive ordnance disposal, and coordination of the Department of Defense Key Asset Protection Program (Chapt. 7).

The final category is community assistance. "Community assistance applies the skills, capabilities and resources of the Army to the needs and interests of America and local communities" (8-1).

Included in community assistance are national efforts such as public works maintenance and management (a primary function of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) and national

assistance programs like the Civilian Community Corps, the Civilian Youth Opportunities Program, the Drug Demand Reduction Program, the Medical Readiness Program, air ambulance support, and support to national and international events. State and local community assistance involves the creation and operation of community assistance and relations councils, speakers bureaus, band support to community functions, Army exhibits, community construction and demolition projects, support to youth programs, projects to enhance the educational or cultural climate, and participation in special events such as community fire prevention awareness (Chapt. 8).

These key Army manuals recognize the importance of the domestic support missions. The manuals also emphasize the critical aspect of Army public affairs.

The Army Public Affairs Mission in Domestic Support

The Army public affairs officers' mission is to meet the information needs of the military leadership, soldiers, military families, and the American public...public affairs programs will increasingly have a pivotal role in the success of military objectives (USDA, Pam 600-3 38-1).

In response to the growing domestic support mission, the Army's Office of the Chief of Public Affairs devised the "Peacetime Engagement Public Affairs Plan" in April 1992.

The plan outlined "public affairs actions to support the Army's commitment to Peacetime Engagement" and included specific guidance to key agencies involved in Army public affairs (USDA, OCPA, "PA Plan - PE" 1).

The communication objectives included:

1) To explain that while the primary mission of the U.S. Army remains defense, we serve our nation--and the world--in many other ways.

2) To convey to the American public that the unique and thorough training of our Total Army (all components) is a ready force prepared to help with: search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and health research, peacekeeping operations, disaster relief, counter drug initiatives by civil authorities, and environmental protection (2).

"Peacetime Engagement" was later revised and renamed "Partners in Freedom." The new campaign objectives included

highlight(ing) the role of America's Army as totally committed partners in the nation's drug control efforts; emphasize the Total Army's commitment to adding value to America through education; highlight the Army's nation-building and peacekeeping roles around the globe; highlight the Army's service to the nation through support to civil authorities; highlight the Army's contributions to expanding the frontiers of health

care; and highlight America's role in developing leaders for tomorrow (USDA, OCPA "Army Communications Strategy" 36-41).

The revised Operations and new Domestic Support Operations manuals provide additional direction to Army public affairs.

In response to the public affairs implications of the new doctrine, Colonel Ron Grubb, public affairs officer for the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, wrote:

public affairs must be viewed in relation to joint, combined, and coalition warfare...(PAOs) must understand the organization and operations of other services....(PAOs must be versatile, they must) be able to perform well during civil-relief operations...civil augmentation (and during various other operations)....(PAOs) must be able to deploy with their units....accept deployed reserve units(and) the PAO must know how to support the commander's intent and the stated goal. The PAO must know and state priorities for the mission at hand, then work toward achieving them (Grubb 6).

The Operations manual emphasized the importance of media relations and internal or command information.

Providing early and continuous access to the press throughout the force-projection stages enhances

operations and strengthens public support. Misuse of this element can endanger units and weaken public support. Within the command, an effective internal information program also enhances the morale of soldiers, reinforces training and safety messages, and corroborates media reports for both soldiers and their families (USDA, FM 100-5 3-7).

The importance of Army public affairs is apparent throughout the Domestic Support Operations manual. Public affairs is included as a critical support operation.

Public affairs is a critical consideration in Army domestic support operations and commanders must be prepared to operate in an environment of complex information demands. Domestic support operations impart a lasting impression on the high degree of commitment of the civil/military teams. Ultimately the people's impression of the ability and success in the assistance effort depends on what they get from the media. The public's perception of the success or failure of the domestic support effort will be influenced by the close cooperation and coordination between commanders and civilian leaders. Their perception will also be influenced by the successful efforts of the public affairs personnel (USDA, Draft FM 100-19 4-19).

It also emphasizes the importance of commanders providing "timely and pertinent information to the media"-- in person if necessary. During domestic support missions, they are to provide "the information needs of their soldiers" to maintain morale and unit esprit de corps (4-19).

Public affairs officers involved in domestic support operations are to ensure interagency cooperation and coordination. They are to establish an Army information bureau and advise commanders "on the information demands that he can anticipate, the information strategies available, and the effect of the information communication effort" (4-20).

In addition, the manual emphasizes public affairs considerations in support of each of the primary domestic support missions. It stresses the importance of the public affairs staff training themselves and training commanders, staff and soldiers in public affairs. It also encourages commanders to include public affairs officers as part of their domestic support management teams.

Undoubtedly, Army public affairs officers require training geared toward domestic support. McClain wrote, "Through experience and training we can develop this 'sixth sense' (ability to anticipate). And our experience can be increased through case studies, after action reports and other similar documents" (McClain 2).

What training should Army public affairs officers receive to prepare them for domestic support operations?

Training of Army Public Affairs Officers

Army officers generally enter public affairs after having served for several years in a "basic" branch such as infantry, aviation, or military police. Therefore, they have a base knowledge of the Army and specific soldier and officer skills from which to build. Their prior experience and training help them understand basic Army doctrine and operations.

Their civilian counterparts may be Army Reserve officers, Army retirees or other civilians who have training and experience in public affairs and public relations.

Basic Qualities. What basic qualities must these public affairs officers possess?

According to Robert S. Cole, author of The Practical Handbook of Public Relations, managers in the civilian domain look for "bright people with a good education...a degree in public relations, communication, or journalism." They also want "people with good experience in public relations," flexibility, creativity, writing ability, a pleasant personality, inquisitiveness and news sense, salesmanship, and "a knowledge of or interest in the field in which the firm operates" (Cole 180-183).

Army public affairs officer students do not always possess these qualities upon entering the specialty.

Jon White, director of the executive M.B.A. program in public relations at England's Cranfield School of Management, acknowledged that some public relations skills were innate while others can be taught.

Public relations is a complex practice that does require a base of theoretical and general knowledge, best acquired through formal programs of education. The basic skills of the practice -- of communication and management -- can be developed through education (that introduces the principles that underlie the skills) and training (that allows for skills to be practiced in settings where mistakes will not have real-world consequences) (18).

The "Public Affairs Officer Course" is designed to provide the basics.

Current Training Programs. The Department of Defense's Defense Information School conducts training for all Department of Defense public affairs officers.

The "Public Affairs Officer Course" is the primary or basic public affairs officer course. It is available to all services and service component military and civilian public affairs officers. It is approximately 10 weeks long. The

"Public Affairs Officer Course - Reserve Component" is available to reserve officers who require a shorter course --usually two weeks. The "Senior Public Affairs Officer Course" is a one-week seminar for more senior public affairs officers. The "Joint Public Affairs Officer Course" allows experienced public affairs officers of all services to focus on interservice or "joint" operations.

Other training available to Army public affairs officers includes the "Advanced Civil Schooling Program," in which officers attend civilian universities to obtain graduate degrees related to public affairs; "Training With Industry," in which senior officers spend 10 months working in civilian media; and the "Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course," which is advanced public affairs training offered at civilian universities that lasts 10 weeks (USDA, OCPA "Professional Development" Parts II and III).

Classes offered during the "Public Affairs Officer Course" provide training in the fundamentals of public affairs, public affairs policy, journalism, broadcasting, media relations, command information, and community relations.

Training Focus: Knowledges and Skills. "Public Affairs Officer Course" classes are all designed to provide a degree of the critical, significant and contributing knowledges and skills Army public affairs officers require.

For example, the Army Chief of Public Affairs has determined that the critical knowledges for Army captains include,

how to be a spokesperson, the needs of audiences, the Army story, means and methods of communication, commander's public affairs intent, principles of print and electronic journalism, and principles of communication law to include laws associated with the First Amendment (13).

Critical skills include,

be an effective command spokesperson, write news releases, obtain feedback at all levels and determine effectiveness of public affairs efforts on all audiences, provide feedback to the commander on his public affairs efforts, set the record straight, assess public affairs issues for commander and staff, integrate organizational goals into public affairs effort, develop public affairs strategy and plans, publish effective newspaper, assess public affairs impact of news media issues, and direct operations of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service affiliate station (public affairs broadcasters only)(12).

Likewise, Army civilian public affairs officers require a vast knowledge base. Their knowledges must include:

editing; English language; methods and techniques for oral presentations; organization of electronic and printed media; persuasive communication techniques; pictorial presentation; principles, methods and techniques of mass communication; public affairs methods and procedures for responding to queries; reference sources for laws, regulations and guidance....(Donovan A-38-40).

Basic training in domestic support is provided during the "Public Affairs Officer Course" through the "Public Affairs and Civil Preparedness" course. Upon completion of the course, students should be able to

identify and explain the types of emergency situations in which a military public affairs officer may become involved with civilian authorities; describe/discuss the responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Customs Service the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and other emergency and law enforcement organizations; explain the relationships that must exist between the military and civilian agencies...to ensure

proper intra- and interagency release authority;
and define the 'Posse Comitatus Act' and its effect
on the use of the military in law enforcement
situations (USDoD, DINFOS "Lesson Plan" 3).

The course provides a base of knowledge that is useful
to Army public affairs officers. The topics covered in this
and other instruction should adequately prepare Army public
affairs officers for domestic support operations.

Domestic Support Knowledges and Skills

Domestic support operations are unique in several ways
and require public affairs officers to be adept in certain
knowledges and skills.

Psychology. Public affairs and public relations
practitioners need to know the psychology involved in
disaster relief operations.

Saundra K. Schneider, assistant professor in Government
and International Studies at the University of South
Carolina, conducted a detailed analysis of "Governmental
Response to Disasters." She identified the strong potential
for the development of a "gap" between "emergent" norms and
"bureaucratic" norms during natural disasters (137).

The affected public's emergent norms developed as a
result of a search for meaning in the disaster--milling
process, rumor communication, and the selection of specific
ideas or keynoting (137).

Bureaucratic norms are fairly structured on policies and procedures. Negative public opinion can result when relief operations do not rapidly meet the perceived or actual needs of the public.

During Army disaster relief operations, Army public affairs officers, commanders and staffs must determine emergent public norms and be aware of the milling process. They must identify rumor communication and keynoting and determine what if any gap exists between relief plans and the needs of the victims. A gap will affect the publics' perceived success or failure of the relief efforts (137).

Emergent norms were reflected in newspaper editorials regarding Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew and the Loma Prieta Earthquake. A content analysis of the editorials revealed that primary criticism of relief efforts included: ineffectiveness, indecisiveness, nonresponsiveness, inefficiency and red tape, confusion and overlapping jurisdictions, distribution problems, poor communications, poorly trained staffs, lack of compassion, and incompetence (Meyer 3).

Primary praise of relief efforts included: quick and immediate response of local public service agencies and utilities, cooperation, disaster planning, prior emergency drills, forecasting, evacuation, local media communication, and military preparedness and response (3).

Planning Communication. In early 1993, this researcher prepared an issues tracking report on public relations during natural disasters. The lessons learned can apply to Army public affairs efforts during disaster relief operations.

The report suggested that before and during these missions, "Army public affairs officers, commanders and staffs must plan the public affairs efforts to communicate relief efforts in the best possible light to the primary, intervening, and special publics" (Meyer 3).

To reassure the public and maintain favorable public opinion,

positive messages should include: empathy and compassion; reassurances of cooperative, responsiveness, professionalism and competence, efficiency, effectiveness, and preparedness on the part of those involved in the relief effort.

(Public affairs officers must) create community relations and media relations plans to establish and maintain open communication with the primary publics, opinion leaders, special publics, and the media...to dispel rumor communication and influence keynoting.

(They must) create command information plans to keep all military and civilian personnel properly

informed. Their personal interaction with the publics and media will impact rumors and keynoting (3).

In addition, "Army public affairs officers, commanders and staffs must quickly restore or maintain public communication networks" (3).

Acceptable social norms are reinforced when "the public receives immediate reassurance as well as guidance from the normal authorities and sources of information" (Schneider 143).

Evaluation. Evaluation of public affairs efforts is essential during and after all domestic support operations.

Every natural disaster relief operation differs to some degree...Public affairs officers, commanders and staffs must continuously conduct factfinding/research during these operations to determine what the current situation is and what communication needs are developing. This may lead to a revised plan and use of alternate forms of communication. Also, continuous evaluation of current efforts is necessary. Public affairs efforts must be modified to meet changing needs (Meyer 3).

Public Affairs/Public Relations Duties. A review of the duties required of public affairs officers and public relations practitioners during recent domestic support

operations and natural disasters may highlight primary knowledges and skills.

Allstate insurance became heavily involved in relief efforts after Hurricane Hugo in 1989. Their involvement included various aspects of public relations.

A specially designated and highly visible "catastrophe team" quickly communicated to the public that "the company was on the scene" (Allstate 1).

Public relations personnel provided media interviews and releases (by mobile phone and fax), assisted an audio-visual crew that documented the activity (Allstate later produced a television commercial from this footage), provided internal information in company publications, coordinated company donations to the Red Cross and other funds, and answered thank-you notes from satisfied customers (2).

In 1990, public relations professional Michael J. Allen wrote about public relations knowledges and skills related to the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake.

In this era of big-budget, highly mobile and technologically sophisticated media, response organizations simply cannot start from zero when a disaster strikes. We all know by now that we must have a plan for working with the media; we must identify staff and pre-position the equipment needed to implement the plan; and we must practice

thoroughly. But even with the best of preparation, we must resign ourselves to playing catch-up for a few days to media that are way out in front (25).

He identified four typical stages of media coverage. Allen wrote, "organizations...must think through each function to be performed at each stage in the pattern... (they need to) conform to the pattern of interest the media are sure to follow" (25).

Public affairs and public relations practitioners need to know that the typical media coverage stages include: initially,

death and destruction coverage...(shifts to) stories about human tragedy and heroics...(then shifts to) the work of the various organizations responding to the disaster. Finally, ...issues related to long-term recovery (25).

They need to communicate the following: safety hazards, the location of loved ones, the condition of public and private property, and the progress of and prognosis for recovery activities and availability of relief programs (25).

Modern technology is now a fact of life in public affairs and public relations activities following disasters. Practitioners must have and know how to operate facsimile machines, computers with modems, and various databases and

software. They also must have portable communication equipment such as radios or cellular telephones, high-volume copiers, broadcast feed and other video systems, television receivers, AM/FM radios, and video cassette recorders.

Practitioners must be involved in advising superiors about public concern, opinion and attitudes. They must "command a place at the table where operational decisions are being made" (26).

Coordination was key during the relief effort. A minimum of 15 federal, state and local agencies were involved including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Sixth Army. "The public information function was fully integrated. A single Joint Information Center served all of the...organizations represented" (26).

Additional tasks and skills identified included: "outreach personnel who roamed the...communities making face-to-face contact with church leaders, community organizations, mayors and other local officials" and monitoring and interpreting news reporting in broadcast and print media (26).

Lucy Hobgood-Brown, director of public relations and communications for the Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison law firm, provided additional insight regarding public relations tasks during the earthquake. She interviewed numerous San Francisco area public relations professionals and compiled

their suggestions in a spring 1990 article in the Professional Communicator magazine.

The key was satisfying the international news media. Some suggestions to accomplish this included: keeping copies of media directories and telephone numbers at another location besides your office, using fax machines rather than mailing or delivering releases, having and using battery powered laptop computers, keeping disaster emergency kits (including comfortable shoes, sweaters, flashlights, notebooks and snacks), having specially equipped vehicles for use during disasters, have a manual typewriter and preprinted mailing labels (for news releases), and always responding to and satisfying media queries (8-10).

The Pacific Gas and Electric Company was severely affected by the earthquake. According to its public relations office, it "required the most intensive emergency response effort in PG&E's history" (Pacific 1).

An emergency response drill held just four months before the earthquake helped prepare company employees for the "real thing." Public relations personnel basically knew what to do and what messages to communicate. A "continuous and accurate" flow of information was provided to the media.

Public relations practitioners were involved in producing written and oral news media releases; meeting customers and community representatives; producing letters

to shareholders; phoning security analysts; holding media briefings; communicating with employees by hot line phone, special employee publications, and video programs; and providing other community relations services. The efforts were evaluated through opinion polls (2).

The military forces that responded to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, were organized under Joint Task Force Andrew. Chapter VIII of the draft "Lessons Learned from Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki" document covers Army public affairs. The chapter identifies many of the public affairs tasks required in the domestic support operation.

Public affairs personnel deployed early in the relief effort and obtained logistical support to establish a joint information center. They provided information to the media and internal audiences and coordinated all public affairs operations and information among civil and military agencies. Their media relations played a key part in producing "public confidence in the military's ability to provide disaster relief" (28).

Hurricane Andrew damaged many commercial broadcast facilities. The Army established an AM radio station, "Radio Recovery." The station was operated by special operations forces but used U.S. Army Reserve public affairs broadcasters as announcers (29).

Likewise, after Hurricane Iniki damaged Hawaii, a military broadcaster was co-located with a commercial media outlet to "communicate the military message to the affected civilian population during disaster relief efforts" (30).

Major Joseph Trahan III, an Army Reserve officer and professor at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, provided insight into Army public affairs operations during Hurricane Andrew in the December 14, 1992, issue of pr reporter (tips & tactics).

The major tasks of the joint information center were to handle media inquiries, coordinate media responses, escort media representatives, prepare daily media briefings for superiors, provide command and control for U.S. Army Reserve public affairs detachments, and assist in the establishment and operation of the tri-lingual "Radio Recovery" (1).

The knowledges he gained include:

- 1) Have an easy-to-understand and yearly tested crisis communication plan.
- 2) Equip a...(transportable) container with laptop computers, printers, cellular phones, ...radios, fax, tv/vcr ..., beepers, clocks, software..., high speed copiers.
- 3) Communication channels must be successfully analyzed and properly utilized in order to get your messages out and understood.

- 4) ...immediately establish direct and credible working relationship with the operations, logistics, personnel and other staffers.
- 5) PR/PA senior staffer must be involved with all policy decisions and have direct and total access to the Chief Executive Officer.
- 6) All media inquiries must be routed and answered by...only ONE media inquiry section.
- 7) (Public affairs personnel must) Remain flexible...be accessible to the media...be patient with the media...(2).

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division, prepared a "Hurricane Andrew After Action Report." Section 11 of the report identifies knowledges public affairs officers must have for future disaster operations.

During the relief operations, the media focused on timeliness of agency response, local and minority subcontracting and hiring, environmental effects, and cost and efficiency of federal contracts for recovery work. "Media demands for information were instantaneous and enormous, and the importance of timely response to them cannot be overstated" (11-1).

Recommendations for public affairs personnel included: arrive at the disaster site immediately as part of the advance team; initially, give priority to "serving the media

and the public;" identify nearby photographic processing facilities and use Ektachrome film; work closely with and counsel USACE contracting personnel; and do not misstate or overstate facts--to maintain credibility.

In addition to operating in close coordination with the other agencies involved, the "Corps must have its own independent public affairs operation and not depend on the Joint Information Center solely for media interface" (11-8).

Annex P (Public Affairs OPLAN) to Operations Plan D15 "Civil Disturbance Operations," California National Guard also is useful. It outlines public affairs operations in anticipation of a potential civil disturbance in the Los Angeles area in April 1993.

Public affairs tasks at the Office of the Adjutant General included:

- responding to and documenting all media inquiries,
- receiving and responding to all public inquiries,
- coordinating...for situation reports, producing...
- public affairs guidance, developing...news releases
- ...providing a daily media advisory..., producing
- an...after action report (3).

Subordinate public affairs elements were responsible for

- establishing...communication with the Sr PAO,
- coordinating CNG (Calif. National Guard)
- information with federal, state and local LEAs (law

enforcement agencies) and their PA representatives at the EOC (emergency operations center) and the JIC (joint information center), establishing a modified press camp headquarters operation..., briefing the...senior staff, safely deploying... units to the emergency site, coordinating...for billeting and feeding, providing...media escort teams, conducting situational briefings to the media, maintaining a daily journal of PA events and activities, coordinating...for vehicle maintenance support, a secondary mission of taking 35mm photos and video tape of CNG soldiers..., providing all command (internal) information for units deployed ..., (and) preparing information sheets in advance on the units of the division... (3-4).

Public affairs officers were specifically expected to know what information violated operational security; public affairs procedures and policies regarding shootings, serious injuries or death, vehicle accidents, and aircraft crashes; the prescribed "Rules of Engagement," and how to handle media requests for transportation in military aircraft (4,9,10).

This information provides insight into the knowledges and skills public affairs and public relations practitioners used and should use during domestic support operations.

Summary

The United States has always depended on its armed forces for domestic support. Throughout the nation's history, active duty Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard troops have helped build and maintain the nation.

The end of the "Cold War" has increased the Army's involvement in peacetime missions. Recent natural disasters such as Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki saw thousands of military personnel involved in relief and recovery operations.

The Army has begun to accept its increased involvement in these missions. Two new field manuals now include guidance for operations other than war. They are field manuals 100-5, Operations and 100-19, Domestic Support Operations.

Army public affairs officers must be prepared to support domestic support operations. Their mission is to ensure that internal and external publics are informed of the Army's intentions and actions.

These officers receive public affairs training from various sources. The Department of Defense, Defense Information School provides most of the training.

Public affairs officers must possess a variety of knowledges and skills to perform their missions. Domestic support operations require some unique knowledges and

skills. Training developers need to identify these to develop and provide adequate training.

A review of literature involving past operations--from both the civilian and military aspect--revealed several public affairs or relations duties. Experienced practitioners provided valuable insight on the knowledges and skills necessary to perform public affairs support of domestic support operations.

Many of these knowledges and skills are taught during the "Public Affairs Officer Course" at the Defense Information School. However, they are not taught in the context of domestic support operations.

The available information is useful, however it does not clearly identify the important knowledges and skills Army public affairs officers need to operate effectively in domestic support operations.

Furthermore, do public affairs officers from the various Army components require different training and emphasis? And, do knowledges and skills required vary among the four primary domestic support operations?

Jon White contends, "What is vital in public relations education and training programs is the proper integration of 'real-world' experience" (18).

As Maj. Gen. McClain and Jon White maintain, course developers need to learn from the past and integrate real-world experience. This research seeks to draw from the experiences of Army public affairs officers to provide answers to the research questions. The answers will form the basis for better Army public affairs officer domestic support operations education and training.

Methods

Design of Study

To answer the research questions, a mail survey was administered.

The Army's Office of the Chief of Public Affairs provided a list of Army public affairs officers and key points of contact who were involved in civil support operations since 1985. The National Guard Bureau provided a listing of state National Guard public affairs officers. Other Army documents identified units involved in domestic support operations. The names of public affairs officers were combined with the units, phone contact was made with the points of contact, and a list of 129 subjects was developed.

Sample

The list of respondents included 46 active duty and Army Reserve public affairs officers, 51 National Guard and 32 U.S. Army Corps of Engineer public affairs officers. The list provided a "best estimate" total population.

Also, the researcher compiled background information from the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kentucky National Guard, U.S. Army - Pacific, Defense Information School,

Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army War College,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of (U.S. Army)
Operations, Office of the Director of Military Support (U.S.
Army), and the Public Relations Society of America.

Procedures

The survey questionnaire, based upon the information provided from the previously mentioned sources, used a combination of open- and closed-ended questions and employed Likert rating scales and multiple choice questions (see appendix B).

It listed the common knowledges and skills public affairs officers normally possess and specific knowledges and skills related to public affairs in support of domestic support operations. The respondents rated the relative importance of each knowledge and each skill, as related to the domestic support mission. Respondents were asked to answer the questionnaire with one of the four primary categories of domestic support operations in mind.

The questionnaire asked public affairs officers to indicate other knowledges and skills that are important or very important to the performance of domestic support operations.

It concluded by asking for demographic information.

Three Army public affairs officers pretested the questionnaire.

Each survey respondent was mailed a preliminary notification postcard, a questionnaire with cover letter (see appendix A) and return envelop.

The cover letter included a requested return date that was four weeks from the date of the mailing.

Treatment of Data

The researcher used frequencies and means to indicate the strength of each response.

Analyses of variance were used to determine significant differences in responses by component, rank and grade, civilian post secondary school major, training, and type of domestic support operation involved.

When significant analyses of variance were found, a Post hoc multiple comparison procedure was employed.

Results

The survey was conducted in June and July 1993. Two hundred two questionnaires were sent to 129 public affairs officers. Many received more than one questionnaire to hand out to public affairs officer coworkers. Only those who had experience in public affairs support of domestic support operations were eligible.

Ninety-three questionnaires were returned. Four were not usable because they were incomplete or the respondents were unable to complete the questionnaire. Therefore, the response rate of 89, based upon 129 public affairs officers, was 71 percent.

The Statistical Analysis System (SAS) was used to analyze the survey data. Frequency and means identified the ranking of knowledges and skills. Analyses of variance involving components and domestic support operation categories provided the supporting data to answer research questions three and four. Post hoc analyses identified significant differences.

Open-ended questions provided additional information and responses are considered in the "Discussion" section.

Demographics

Fifty-six military officers and 33 Army civilians responded.

The largest group of respondents were National Guard public affairs officers (35 Army and 4 Air National Guard).

Other Army respondents included 23 active duty, 20 Army Corps of Engineers, two Army Reserve, and one public affairs officer from a State Area Command.

The Army military officers were primarily majors (23), captains (12) and lieutenant colonels (9). Four colonels, three lieutenants and one officer candidate also responded.

The Air National Guard officers included one captain, two majors and one lieutenant colonel.

The Army civilians included 12 at grade GS 12, 12 at grade GS/GM 13, three at grade GS 10/11, two at grade 8/9, and four at higher grades (one at State Level 14, two at GS/GM 14 and one at GM 15).

All respondents had undergraduate college degrees. Forty respondents had degrees related to communications while 49 did not.

Thirty-eight respondents had graduate degrees. Fifteen had graduate degrees related to communications while 23 did not.

Thirty-six of the respondents had completed the ten-week "Public Affairs Officer Course" at the Defense Information School. Fourteen had only civilian college communications training and no formal Army public affairs training. Twelve were graduates of the two-week "Public Affairs Officer

Course - Reserve Component." Nine completed the "Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course," one had a graduate degree in communications through the "Advanced Civil Schooling Program," and three had other public affairs training. Fourteen indicated no formal public affairs training.

The 89 respondents participated in at least 187 domestic support operations. Fifty-five percent of the operations were disaster or domestic emergency operations, 23 percent were law enforcement support, eight percent were environmental assistance, and 14 percent were community assistance operations.

Fifty-six respondents (63 percent) had experience in at least one disaster or domestic emergency operation. Thirty (33.7 percent) had experience in at least one law enforcement support operation. Fourteen (15.7 percent) had experience in at least one environmental assistance operation and 18 (20.2 percent) had experience in at least one community assistance operation. Many had experience in more than one type of operation.

Seventeen did not indicate the type of domestic support operation in which they were involved.

Knowledges

Statistical means and frequency procedures identified the respondents' importance rating of public affairs knowledges in support of Army domestic support operations.

As seen in Table 1, knowing what the commander expects from public affairs was identified as most important (M = 4.67). Other "very important" to "important" knowledges in descending order are public issues impacting the mission (M = 4.61), knowing media outlets and their requirements (M = 4.59), knowing the needs of external publics (M = 4.56), knowing the most useful communication methods for domestic support (M = 4.36), and knowing state and local government emergency relief operations (M = 4.07).

The following knowledges were identified between "important" and "average" importance to conducting public affairs support during domestic support operations: knowing the needs of internal publics (M = 3.97), knowing joint information center operations (M = 3.91), knowing federal government emergency relief operations (M = 3.72), knowing information about opinion leaders (M = 3.70), knowing the fundamentals of print journalism (M = 3.67), knowing radio and television broadcast procedures (M = 3.65), knowing the fundamentals of electronic journalism (M = 3.53), knowing mobile public affairs detachment deployment (M = 3.48), knowing applicable civil laws (M = 3.47), knowing information in the Army public affairs manual and regulations (M = 3.37), and knowing the principles of communication law related to the First Amendment (M = 3.28).

Respondents listed the remaining knowledges between "average" and "little" importance to the conduct of public affairs during domestic support operations. They include: knowing broadcast public affairs detachment employment (M = 2.75), knowing how to publish an Army newspaper (M = 2.67), and knowing how to conduct communication research (M = 2.38).

Personal Skills

Statistical means and frequency procedures identified the respondents' importance rating of personal public affairs skills in support of Army domestic support operations (Table 2).

Respondents rated the personal skill of coordinating with the commander as most important (M = 4.76). Other "very important" to "important" personal skills include: coordinating with the staff (M = 4.62), providing leadership (M = 4.46), producing written communication (M = 4.18), and performing public speaking duties (M = 4.06).

Conducting public relations evaluation was rated at slightly above "average" importance (M = 3.28) and conducting communication research was between "average" and "little" importance to public affairs support of domestic support missions (M = 2.44).

Table 1.
Importance Ranking of Knowledge Questions

Questions in Rank Order	Responses: Number/Percent					NR*	Mean
	5	4	3	2	1		
5. What the Commander expects from PA	66 74.2	17 19.1	6 6.7	0 0	0 0	0	4.67
8. Public issues impacting the mission	61 68.5	23 25.8	3 3.4	2 2.2	0 0	0	4.61
15. Media outlets and their requirements	61 69.3	20 22.7	5 5.7	2 2.3	0 0	1	4.59
13. Needs of external publics	59 67.8	21 24.1	5 5.7	1 1.1	1 1.1	2	4.56
16. Useful communication methods	47 54.7	27 31.4	9 10.5	2 2.3	1 1.1	3	4.36
2. State/local gov't relief operations	30 33.7	40 44.9	16 18.0	1 1.1	2 2.2	0	4.07
12. Needs of internal publics	25 28.7	41 47.1	15 17.2	5 5.7	1 1.1	2	3.97
3. Joint information center operations	28 31.8	34 38.6	19 21.6	4 4.5	3 3.4	1	3.91
1. Federal government relief operations	26 29.2	30 33.7	21 23.6	6 6.7	6 6.7	0	3.72
14. Information about opinion leaders	20 23.0	35 40.2	21 24.1	8 9.2	3 3.4	2	3.70
17. Fundamentals of print journalism	23 26.1	22 25.0	35 39.8	7 8.0	1 1.1	1	3.67
20. Radio and TV broadcast procedures	22 25.0	30 34.1	24 27.3	7 8.0	5 5.7	1	3.65

Note: 5 = Very Important, 4 = Important, 3 = Average,
2 = Little Importance, 1 = Not Important

*NR = Number who did not respond

Table 1, continued

Questions in Rank Order	Responses: Number/Percent					NR*	Mean
	5	4	3	2	1		
19. Fundamentals of electronic journalism	21 23.9	26 29.5	26 29.5	9 10.2	6 6.8	1	3.53
9. Mobile PA detachment employment	24 27.6	27 31.0	16 18.4	7 8.0	13 14.9	2	3.48
7. Applicable civil laws	13 14.6	30 33.7	33 37.1	12 13.5	1 1.1	0	3.47
4. Info. in Army PA manual/regulations	11 12.4	29 32.6	34 38.2	12 13.5	3 3.4	0	3.37
6. Principles of comm. law/First Amendment	14 15.9	20 22.7	33 37.5	19 21.6	2 2.3	1	3.28
10. Broadcast PA detachment employment	8 9.4	18 21.2	25 29.4	13 15.3	21 24.7	4	2.75
18. How to publish an Army newspaper	9 10.2	10 11.4	30 34.1	21 23.9	18 20.5	1	2.67
11. How to conduct communication research	1 1.1	11 12.5	27 30.7	30 34.1	19 21.6	1	2.38

Note: 5 = Very Important, 4 = Important, 3 = Average,
2 = Little Importance, 1 = Not Important

*NR = Number who did not respond

Table 2.
Importance Ranking of Personal Skills Questions

Questions in Rank Order	Responses: Number/Percent					NR*	Mean
	5	4	3	2	1		
7. Coordinate with commander	70 78.7	17 19.1	2 2.2	0 0	0 0	0	4.76
6. Coordinate with staff	60 67.4	24 27.0	5 5.6	0 0	0 0	0	4.62
1. Provide leadership	52 58.4	27 30.3	9 10.1	1 1.1	0 0	0	4.46
2. Produce written communication	38 42.7	32 36.0	16 18.0	3 3.4	0 0	0	4.18
3. Perform public speaking duties	34 38.2	33 37.1	15 16.9	7 7.9	0 0	0	4.06
5. Conduct public relations evaluation	16 18.0	22 24.7	30 33.7	13 14.6	8 9.0	0	3.28
4. Conduct communication research	4 4.5	6 6.7	33 37.1	28 31.5	18 20.2	0	2.44

Mean for Personal Skills = 27.80

Note: 5 = Very Important, 4 = Important, 3 = Average,
 2 = Little Importance, 1 = Not Important

*NR = Number who did not respond

Administrative and Management Skills

Statistical means and frequency procedures identified the respondents' importance rating of public affairs administrative and management skills in support of Army domestic support operations (Table 3).

Establishing an information bureau or center was rated as the most important skill in this category ($M = 4.15$). Coordinating with other agencies for personnel and logistic support was also highly rated ($M = 4.13$).

The remaining skills rated slightly below "important" but more important than "average." They include: conducting a public affairs element deployment ($M = 3.83$), conducting resource management ($M = 3.76$), conducting personnel management ($M = 3.65$), and producing a public affairs operations plan/appendix/annex ($M = 3.57$).

Media Relations Skills

Statistical means and frequency procedures identified the respondents' importance rating of public affairs officers' media relations skills in support of Army domestic support operations (Table 4).

Respondents rated handling news media phone queries as the most important media relations skill public affairs officers must have (4.56).

Most other skills in this category rated between "very important" and "important." They include: arranging and

Table 3.
Importance Ranking of Administrative
and Management Skills Questions

Questions in Rank Order	Responses: Number/Percent					NR*	Mean
	5	4	3	2	1		
6. Establish an information bureau/center	37 78.7	35 19.1	11 2.2	5 0	1 0	0	4.15
4. Coordinate with other agencies for support	33 37.1	39 43.8	14 15.7	2 2.2	1 1.1	0	4.13
5. Conduct a PA element deployment	30 34.5	27 31.0	18 20.7	9 10.3	3 3.4	2	3.83
3. Conduct resource management	28 31.5	25 28.1	27 30.3	5 5.6	4 4.5	0	3.76
2. Conduct personnel management	19 21.3	35 39.3	25 28.1	5 5.6	5 5.6	0	3.65
1. Produce a PA operations plan/appendix	20 22.5	31 34.8	24 27.0	8 9.0	6 6.7	0	3.57

Mean for Administrative and Management Skills = 23.01

Note: 5 = Very Important, 4 = Important, 3 = Average,
 2 = Little Importance, 1 = Not Important

*NR = Number who did not respond

conducting press briefings (M = 4.47), arranging and conducting press interviews (M = 4.44), producing responses to inquiries (questions and answers) (M = 4.39), performing media escort duties (M = 4.22), correcting inaccurate news media reports (M = 4.21), writing news releases (M = 4.10), and assessing news media issues for public affairs impact (M = 4.03).

Producing a media relations plan (M = 3.75) and determining the effectiveness of the plan/initiatives (M = 3.58) were rated below "important" but above "average" importance to the conduct of public affairs during domestic support operations.

Command Information Skills

Statistical means and frequency procedures identified the respondents' importance rating of public affairs officers' command information skills in support of Army domestic support operations (Table 5).

Counseling commanders on command information methods rated the most important (M = 3.69). Other skills that rated between "important" and "average" importance include: determining the information needs of internal publics (M = 3.57), producing a command information plan (M = 3.34), producing a newsletter/newspaper (M = 3.21), and determining the effectiveness of the command information plan/initiatives (M = 3.12).

Table 4.
Importance Ranking of Media Relations Skills

Questions in Rank Order	Responses: Number/Percent					NR*	Mean
	5	4	3	2	1		
3. Handle news media phone queries	62 69.7	19 21.3	5 5.6	2 2.2	1 1.1	0	4.56
6. Arrange and conduct press briefings	54 60.7	26 29.2	7 7.9	1 1.1	1 1.1	0	4.47
5. Arrange and conduct press interviews	55 61.8	22 24.7	10 11.2	1 1.1	1 1.1	0	4.44
9. Produce responses to inquiries (Q&As)	45 50.6	36 40.4	6 6.7	2 2.2	0 0	0	4.39
2. Perform media escort duties	42 47.2	31 34.8	11 12.4	4 4.5	1 1.1	0	4.22
7. Correct inaccurate news media reports	40 44.9	30 33.7	17 19.1	2 2.2	0 0	0	4.21
4. Write news releases	33 37.1	35 39.3	18 20.2	3 3.4	0 0	0	4.10
8. Assess news media issues for PA impact	31 34.8	32 36.0	24 27.0	2 2.2	0 0	0	4.03
1. Produce a media relations plan	17 19.1	44 49.4	20 22.5	5 5.6	3 3.4	0	3.75
10. Determine effectiveness of MR plan	13 14.6	36 40.4	33 37.1	4 4.5	3 3.4	0	3.58

Mean for Media Relations Skills = 41.79

Note: 5 = Very Important, 4 = Important, 3 = Average,
2 = Little Importance, 1 = Not Important

*NR = Number who did not respond

The following rated between "average" and "little" importance: coordinating newspaper distribution ($M = 2.79$), producing radio broadcasts ($M = 2.56$), and producing television broadcasts ($M = 2.53$).

Community Relations Skills

Statistical means and frequency procedures identified the respondents' importance rating of community relations skills in support of Army domestic support operations (Table 6).

The ability to develop contacts with government and other agency officials was rated as the most important community relations skill ($M = 4.38$). Developing contacts with opinion leaders was also rated above "important" ($M = 4.02$).

The remaining skills were rated between "important" and "average" importance. They include: planning and conducting very important persons/public tours ($M = 3.64$), providing or performing duty as a speaker to a community group ($M = 3.49$), producing a community relations plan ($M = 3.35$), and determining the effectiveness of community relations plan/initiatives ($M = 3.33$).

Knowledges by Component

Analyses of variance of knowledges by component identified significant differences ($P < .05$) in answers to the public affairs knowledges questions (Table 7).

Table 5.

Importance Ranking of Command Information Skills

Questions in Rank Order	Responses: Number/Percent						NR*	Mean
	5	4	3	2	1			
5. Counsel commanders on CI methods	25 28.1	30 33.7	19 21.3	11 12.4	4 4.5	0		3.69
7. Determine info. needs of internal publics	15 16.9	35 39.9	28 31.5	8 9.0	3 3.4	0		3.57
1. Produce a command information plan	9 10.1	35 39.3	27 30.3	13 14.6	5 5.6	0		3.34
2. Produce a newsletter/newspaper	14 15.7	21 23.6	31 34.8	16 18.0	7 7.9	0		3.21
8. Determine effectiveness of CI plan	6 6.7	22 24.7	42 47.2	15 16.9	4 4.5	0		3.12
6. Coordinate newspaper distribution	8 9.0	12 13.5	34 38.2	23 25.8	12 13.5	0		2.79
3. Produce radio broadcasts	4 4.5	15 17.0	26 29.5	24 27.3	19 21.6	1		2.56
4. Produce TV broadcasts	5 5.7	13 14.8	25 28.4	26 29.5	19 21.6	1		2.53
Mean for Command Information Skills = 24.75								

Note: 5 = Very Important, 4 = Important, 3 = Average,
2 = Little Importance, 1 = Not Important

*NR = Number who did not respond

Table 6.
Importance Ranking of Community Relations Skills

Questions in Rank Order	Responses: Number/Percent					NR*	Mean
	5	4	3	2	1		
3. Develop contacts with gov't/agency officials	46 51.7	35 39.3	5 5.6	2 2.2	1 1.1	0	4.38
2. Develop contacts with opinion leaders	31 34.8	41 46.1	8 9.0	6 6.7	3 3.4	0	4.02
4. Plan and conduct VIP/public tours	20 22.5	35 39.3	22 24.7	6 6.7	6 6.7	0	3.64
5. Provide or perform as speaker to groups	14 15.7	32 36.0	31 34.8	8 9.0	4 4.5	0	3.49
1. Produce a community relations plan	10 11.2	36 40.4	24 27.0	13 14.6	6 6.7	0	3.35
6. Determine effectiveness of CR plan	6 6.9	35 40.2	30 34.5	14 16.1	2 2.3	2	3.33

Mean for Community Relations Skills = 22.15

Note: 5 = Very Important, 4 = Important, 3 = Average,
 2 = Little Importance, 1 = Not Important

*NR = Number who did not respond

Further Post hoc analyses illuminated the differences between components at the $P < .05$ level.

One limitation in analyzing components was the unequal sample size in each category. There were 23 active duty Army officers, two Army Reserve officers, 39 Army National Guard officers, 20 Corps of Engineers officers and five "other" officers (four Air National Guard and one state-level military public affairs officer).

Components attached significantly different importance ($P = .0001$) to knowledge of "public issues impacting the mission." Post hoc analysis indicated that active duty Army officers ($M = 4.09$) rated this significantly lower in importance than did Corps of Engineers ($M = 4.70$), Army National Guard ($M = 4.85$), and "other" ($M = 5.00$) officers.

The two Army Reserve officers attached more importance to knowing the "needs of external publics" than did the other component officers ($P = .04$).

The importance of knowing "information about opinion leaders" was significantly different among the components ($P = .04$). It was significantly less important to the five officers in the "other" category ($M = 2.60$) than it was to Army National Guard officers ($M = 3.84$) and Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 4.00$).

Knowing the "fundamentals of print journalism" was of significantly different importance to the components ($P =$

.02). Corps of Engineers officers rated this significantly higher ($M = 4.25$) than did Army National Guard officers ($M = 3.54$) and active duty Army officers ($M = 3.36$).

Significant differences also occurred among the components in the importance of knowing "how to publish an Army newspaper" ($P = .02$). Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 3.10$) and active duty Army officers ($M = 3.00$) placed significantly more importance on this knowledge than did Army National Guard officers ($M = 2.26$).

Other knowledge questions showed no significant differences in answers by components.

Skills by Component

Skills by component analyses of variance identified significant differences ($P < .05$) in answers to the importance of public affairs skills questions. Further Post hoc analyses illuminated the differences between components at the $P < .05$ level.

Questions regarding personal skills (Table 8) and administrative and management skills (Table 9) showed no significant differences in answers by components.

Media Relations Skills (Table 10). The components provided significantly different responses ($P = .004$) to the importance of a public affairs officer's skill in "write(ing) news releases." Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 4.45$) attached significantly greater importance to this

Table 7.
Importance of Knowledges by Component

Questions	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
1. Federal gov't relief operations	3.65	3.50	3.41	4.35	4.00	3.72
2. State/local gov't relief operations	3.65	4.00	4.31	4.00	4.40	4.07
3. Joint info. center operations	4.00	4.50	3.68	4.15	4.00	3.91
4. Info. in Army PA manual/regulations	3.70	3.00	3.21	3.45	3.00	3.37
5. What the commander expects from PA	4.48	4.50	4.71	4.90	4.40	4.67
6. Principles of comm. law/First Amendment	3.17	2.50	3.23	3.65	3.00	3.28
7. Applicable civil laws	3.22	3.50	3.64	3.50	3.20	3.47
8. * Public issues impacting mission	4.09	4.00	4.85	4.70	5.00	4.61
9. Mobile PA detach-ment employment	3.69	3.50	3.45	3.16	4.00	3.48
10. Broadcast PA detach. employment	2.73	3.00	2.72	2.58	3.60	2.75
11. How to conduct comm. research	2.50	1.50	2.26	2.55	2.40	2.38
12. Needs of internal publics	4.00	3.00	3.92	4.05	4.20	3.97

* F value is significant at $P = .0001$

Table 7, continued

Questions	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
13. * Needs of external publics	4.52	3.00	4.56	4.75	4.60	4.56
14. * Information about opinion ldrs.	3.41	4.00	3.84	4.00	2.60	3.70
15. Media outlets and their requirements	4.32	5.00	4.67	4.70	4.60	4.59
16. The most useful comm. methods	4.33	4.00	4.37	4.40	4.40	4.36
17. ** Fundamentals of print journalism	3.36	3.00	3.54	4.25	4.00	3.67
18. ** How to publish an Army newspaper	3.00	1.50	2.26	3.10	3.20	2.67
19. Fundamentals of elect. journalism	3.40	2.00	3.46	3.80	4.20	3.53
20. Radio and TV broadcast proced.	3.55	3.00	3.74	3.45	4.40	3.65

* F value is significant at $P = .04$

** F value is significant at $P = .02$

Note: In question 13, although the F value has a $P < .04$, the number of Army Reservists (2) is insufficient to make this finding significant.

Table 8.
Importance of Personal Skills by Component

Questions	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
1. Provide leadership	4.43	4.50	4.51	4.25	5.00	4.46
2. Produce written communication	4.13	4.00	4.15	4.45	3.60	4.18
3. Perform public speaking duties	3.70	4.00	4.23	4.00	4.60	4.06
4. Conduct comm. research	2.39	2.00	2.31	2.80	2.40	2.44
5. Conduct public relations eval.	3.00	2.50	3.31	3.60	3.40	3.28
6. Coordinate with staff	4.30	4.50	4.69	4.70	4.60	4.62
7. Coordinate with commander	4.60	4.50	4.85	4.80	4.80	4.76

Note: F value is significant at $P < .05$ -- none in this category

Table 9.

**Importance of Administrative and
Management Skills by Component**

Questions	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
1. Produce a PA operations plan/appx	3.43	3.50	3.49	3.75	4.20	3.57
2. Conduct personnel management	3.70	3.00	3.64	3.55	4.20	3.65
3. Conduct resource management	3.65	3.50	4.02	3.30	4.20	3.76
4. Coordinate with agencies for support	4.26	4.50	4.12	3.90	4.40	4.13
5. Conduct a PA element deployment	3.87	3.00	3.82	3.78	4.20	3.83
6. Establish an info. bureau/center	4.04	4.50	4.13	4.15	4.60	4.15

Note: F value is significant at $P < .05$ -- none in this category

skill than did active duty Army officers ($M = 3.83$) and the two Army Reserve officers ($M = 2.50$).

The skill of "arrange(ing) and conduct(ing) press interviews" was also of significantly different importance to the components ($P = .03$). Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 4.70$) and Army National Guard officers ($M = 4.54$) felt this skill was significantly more important than did active duty Army officers ($M = 4.08$).

Likewise, the skill of "arrange(ing) and conduct(ing) press briefings" had significantly different importance to the components ($P = .03$). Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 4.70$) attached significantly greater importance to this skill than did the two Army Reserve officers ($M = 3.50$) and active duty Army officers ($M = 4.13$). Also, Army National Guard officers ($M = 4.54$) indicated this skill was significantly more important than did active duty Army officers and the two Army Reserve officers.

Other media relations skills questions showed no significant differences in answers by components.

Command Information Skills (Table 11). Officers of the different components indicated a significantly different level ($P = .04$) of importance attached to the skill of "produce(ing) radio broadcasts." Active duty Army officers ($M = 3.13$) attached significantly more importance to this skill than did Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 2.11$) and

Table 10.

**Importance of Media Relations (MR)
Skills by Component**

Questions	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
1. Produce a media relations plan	3.39	4.00	3.74	4.00	4.40	3.75
2. Perform media escort duties	4.26	4.00	4.26	4.05	4.60	4.22
3. Handle news media phone queries	4.30	4.50	4.67	4.65	4.60	4.56
4. * Write news releases	3.83	2.50	4.21	4.45	3.80	4.10
5. **Arrange/conduct press interviews	4.08	3.50	4.54	4.70	4.80	4.45
6. **Arrange/conduct press briefings	4.13	3.50	4.59	4.70	4.60	4.47
7. Correct inaccurate news media reports	4.22	4.00	4.10	4.45	4.20	4.21
8. Assess news media issues for PA impact	3.96	3.00	4.10	4.15	3.80	4.03
9. Produce responses to inquiries (Q&As)	4.09	4.00	4.56	4.35	4.80	4.39
10. Determine effectiveness of MR plan	3.48	3.00	3.59	3.75	3.60	3.58

* F value is significant at $P = .004$

** F value is significant at $P = .03$

Army National Guard officers ($M = 2.44$). This skill received relatively low ratings by all components.

Other command information skills questions showed no significant differences in answers by components.

Community Relations Skills (Table 12). The importance attached to the skill of "develop(ing) contacts with opinion leaders" was significantly different among the components ($P = .03$). Active duty Army officers ($M = 3.52$) attached significantly less importance to this skill than did Army National Guard officers ($M = 4.18$) and Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 4.40$).

Other community relations skills questions showed no significant differences in answers by components.

Knowledges by Primary Categories of Domestic Support

A knowledge analysis of variance by primary categories of domestic support identified significant differences ($P < .05$) in answers to the importance of public affairs knowledge questions (Table 13). Further Post hoc analyses illuminated the differences between components at the $P < .05$ level.

One limitation in analyzing primary categories of domestic support was the unequal sample size in each category. Respondents were asked to answer the questionnaire by considering their involvement in a specific domestic support operation that they considered had the most

Table 11.
Importance of Command Information (CI)
Skills by Component

Questions	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
1. Produce a command information plan	3.13	3.50	3.38	3.50	3.20	3.34
2. Produce a news-letter/newspaper	3.39	2.00	3.10	3.30	3.40	3.21
3. * Produce radio broadcasts	3.13	2.00	2.44	2.11	2.80	2.56
4. Produce TV broadcasts	2.78	2.00	2.62	2.00	3.00	2.53
5. Counsel commanders on CI methods	3.39	4.00	3.79	3.70	4.00	3.69
6. Coordinate news-paper distribution	3.04	2.50	2.72	2.75	2.40	2.79
7. Determine info. needs/int. publics	3.65	3.00	3.31	4.05	3.60	3.57
8. Determine effectiveness of CI plan	3.13	2.50	2.97	3.40	3.40	3.12

* F value is significant at $P = .04$

Table 12.
Importance of Community Relations (CR)
Skills by Component

Questions	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
1. Produce community relations plan	2.83	3.50	3.44	3.70	3.60	3.35
2. * Develop contacts w/ opinion leaders	3.52	3.50	4.18	4.40	3.80	4.02
3. Dev. contacts with gov't/agency off.	4.04	4.50	4.51	4.45	4.60	4.38
4. Plan and conduct VIP/public tours	3.22	4.00	3.87	3.60	3.80	3.64
5. Provide/perform as speaker to grps.	3.04	3.50	3.67	3.65	3.60	3.49
6. Determine effectiveness of CR plan	2.96	3.00	3.46	3.55	3.40	3.33

* F value is significant at $P = .03$

public affairs training experience value. They were also asked to list the most recent domestic support operation in which they were involved. Based upon the respondents' answers to these questions, there were 48 officers in the disaster or domestic emergency category, 18 in the law enforcement support category, two in the environmental assistance category and four in the community assistance category.

Officers who were involved in the different categories of domestic support attached significantly different ($P = .005$) levels of importance to knowing "federal government emergency relief operations." Officers involved in disasters ($M = 3.94$) attached more importance to this knowledge than did officers involved in law enforcement support ($M = 3.22$) and those in the other two categories.

Likewise, the difference in importance of knowing "joint information center operations" varied significantly ($P = .004$) among categories. Officers involved in law enforcement support ($M = 4.41$) attached significantly more importance to this than did officers involved in disaster operations ($M = 3.83$) and the other two categories.

Knowing "fundamentals of print journalism" was rated significantly differently ($P = .03$) by the officers. Officers involved in disaster operations ($M = 3.83$) rated this knowledge significantly higher than did those involved in law enforcement support ($M = 3.00$).

Officers involved in the four categories also indicated significant differences ($P = .03$) of importance regarding knowing "how to publish an Army newspaper." Officers involved in disasters ($M = 2.73$) attached significantly more importance to this than did officers involved in law enforcement support ($M = 1.78$).

Knowing "radio and television broadcast procedures" was arguably of significant difference by category ($P = .03$). The two officers involved in environmental support ($M = 2.00$) differed significantly with the four involved in community assistance ($M = 4.00$) and those involved in disasters ($M = 3.83$).

Other knowledge questions showed no significant differences in answers by primary categories of domestic support.

Skills by Primary Categories of Domestic Support

Analyses of variance of skills by primary categories of domestic support identified significant differences ($P < .05$) in answers to the importance of public affairs skills questions. Further Post hoc analyses illuminated the differences between officers involved in the primary categories at the $P < .05$ level.

Personal Skills (Table 14). The skill of "conduct(ing) public relations evaluation" was arguably of significant difference by category ($P = .01$). The two officers involved

Table 13.

**Importance of Knowledges by Primary
Categories of Domestic Support**

Questions	Means by Category					Mean
	Disaster/ Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.		
1. * Federal gov't relief operations	3.94	3.22	2.00	2.50	3.63	
2. State/local gov't relief operations	4.04	4.22	3.50	4.00	4.07	
3. **Joint info. cent. operations	3.83	4.41	2.50	2.75	3.87	
4. Info. in Army PA manual/regulations	3.31	3.28	2.00	3.78	3.29	
5. What the commander expects from PA	4.25	4.83	4.50	4.50	4.59	
6. Principles of comm. law/First Amendment	3.11	3.33	3.50	3.50	3.20	
7. Applicable civil laws	3.38	3.72	4.00	3.75	3.50	
8. Public issues impacting mission	4.63	4.56	5.00	4.00	4.58	
9. Mobile PA detach-ment employment	3.57	3.28	3.50	2.50	3.44	
10. Broadcast PA detach. employment	2.85	2.50	3.50	1.67	2.72	
11. How to conduct comm. research	2.35	2.17	1.00	1.67	2.24	
12. Needs of internal publics	3.89	3.78	4.50	4.33	3.90	

* F value is significant at $P = .005$

** F value is significant at $P = .004$

Table 13, continued

Questions	Means by Category				Mean
	Disaster/ Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.	
13. Needs of external publics	4.53	4.61	5.00	4.33	4.56
14. Information about opinion ldrs.	3.48	3.94	4.00	3.67	3.61
15. Media outlets and their requirements	4.58	4.67	5.00	5.00	4.63
16. The most useful comm. methods	4.46	4.06	4.50	4.67	4.36
17. * Fundamentals of print journalism	3.83	3.00	3.50	3.67	3.61
18. * How to publish an Army newspaper	2.73	1.78	2.00	2.33	2.45
19. Fundamentals of elect. journalism	3.63	3.00	3.00	3.67	3.45
20. * Radio and TV broadcast proced.	3.83	3.28	2.00	4.00	3.65

* F value is significant at $P = .03$

Note: In question 20, although the F value has a $P = .03$, the number of PAOs involved in Environmental Assistance (2) is insufficient to make this finding significant.

in environmental assistance ($M = 1.00$) differed significantly with those in each of the other categories (total mean is 3.19).

Other personal skills answers showed no significant differences by primary categories of domestic support.

Administrative and Management Skills (Table 15).

Officers in the categories differed significantly ($P = .02$) in the importance they attached to the skill of "produce(ing) a public affairs operations plan/appendix/annex." Officers involved in law enforcement support ($M = 4.11$) considered this skill significantly more important than did those involved in disaster operations ($M = 3.33$) and the two involved in environmental assistance ($M = 2.00$).

Other administrative and management skills questions showed no significant differences in answers by primary categories of domestic support.

Media Relations Skills (Table 16). The skill of "produce(ing) a media relations plan" was arguably of significant difference among the categories ($P = .02$). The two officers involved in environmental assistance ($M = 2.00$) rated this skill significantly lower than did those in all other categories (total mean was 3.71).

Other media relations skills questions showed no significant differences in answers by primary categories of domestic support.

Table 14.

**Importance of Personal Skills by Primary
Categories of Domestic Support**

Questions	Means by Category				Mean
	Disaster/ Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.	
1. Provide leadership	4.52	4.33	4.00	4.25	4.44
2. Produce written communication	4.13	4.00	5.00	4.75	4.15
3. Perform public speaking duties	4.04	4.17	5.00	4.00	4.10
4. Conduct comm. research	2.35	2.11	1.00	2.75	2.28
5. * Conduct public relations eval.	3.08	3.50	1.00	4.25	3.19
6. Coordinate with staff	4.65	4.72	4.50	4.50	4.65
7. Coordinate with commander	4.77	4.89	4.00	4.75	4.78

* In question 5, although the F value has a $P = .01$, the number of PAOs involved in Environmental Assistance (2) is insufficient to make this finding significant.

Table 15.

**Importance of Administrative and Management Skills
by Primary Categories of Domestic Support**

Questions	Means by Category				Mean
	Disaster/ Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.	
1. * Produce a PA opns. plan/appendix	3.33	4.11	2.00	3.50	3.50
2. Conduct personnel management	3.63	3.50	4.00	3.00	3.57
3. Conduct resource management	3.79	3.83	3.50	3.25	3.76
4. Coordinate with agencies for support	4.17	4.11	4.50	3.75	4.14
5. Conduct a PA element deployment	3.92	3.72	4.00	3.00	3.82
6. Establish an info. bureau/center	4.13	4.22	4.50	4.50	4.18

* F value is significant at $P = .02$

Table 16.

**Importance of Media Relations (MR) Skills by
Primary Categories of Domestic Support**

Questions	Means by Category				Mean
	Disaster/ Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.	
1. * Produce a media relations plan	3.63	4.06	2.00	4.00	3.71
2. Perform media escort duties	4.38	4.11	5.00	4.25	4.32
3. Handle news media phone queries	4.52	4.78	5.00	4.25	4.58
4. Write news releases	4.17	3.67	5.00	4.25	4.07
5. Arrange/conduct press interviews	4.52	4.33	5.00	3.50	4.43
6. Arrange/conduct press briefings	4.50	4.39	5.00	4.00	4.46
7. Correct inaccurate news media reports	4.15	4.33	4.50	4.50	4.22
8. Assess news media issues for PA impact	4.02	4.06	4.00	3.75	4.01
9. Produce responses to inquiries (Q&As)	4.29	4.56	4.50	4.50	4.38
10. Determine effectiveness of MR plan	3.58	3.44	2.00	4.00	3.53

* In question 1, although the F value has a $P = .02$, the number of PAOs involved in Environmental Assistance (2) is insufficient to make this finding significant.

Other Skills. Command information skills (Table 17) and community relations skills (Table 18) showed no significant differences in answers by primary categories of domestic support.

Skill Groups by Components

For this analysis, the individual skills questions were grouped under each of the five skill categories. To determine the relative "importance" each component placed on each skill category, an analysis of variance of each group of skills by component was conducted. This identified significant differences ($P < .05$) in perceived importance of each group of skills. Further Post hoc analyses illuminated the differences between components at the $P < .05$ level (Table 19).

Officers from the different components viewed the importance of media relations skills with significant difference ($P = .03$). Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 43.25$) and Army National Guard officers ($M = 42.36$) rated media relations skills significantly more important than did active duty Army officers ($M = 39.74$). The two Army Reserve officers ($M = 38.00$) also rated these skills significantly lower than did the Corps of Engineers officers.

Community relations skills were also rated with significant differences among the components ($P = .02$). Active duty Army officers ($M = 19.61$) viewed community

Table 17.

**Importance of Command Information (CI) Skills
by Primary Categories of Domestic Support**

Questions	Means by Category				Mean
	Disaster/ Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.	
1. Produce a command information plan	3.17	3.56	1.50	3.00	3.21
2. Produce a news-letter/newspaper	3.15	2.67	2.50	3.50	3.03
3. Produce radio broadcasts	2.65	2.17	2.50	2.67	2.52
4. Produce TV broadcasts	2.52	2.17	2.50	3.67	2.48
5. Counsel commanders on CI methods	3.54	3.72	3.50	3.75	3.60
6. Coordinate news-paper distribution	2.81	2.28	2.50	3.50	2.71
7. Determine info. needs/int. publics	3.46	3.39	3.50	3.50	3.44
8. Determine effectiveness of CI plan	3.04	2.89	2.50	3.00	2.99

Note: F value is significant at $P < .05$ -- none in this category

Table 18.

**Importance of Community Relations (CR) Skills
by Primary Categories of Domestic Support**

Questions	Means by Category				Mean
	Disaster/ Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.	
1. Produce community relations plan	3.08	3.67	2.00	3.50	3.22
2. Develop contacts w/ opinion leaders	3.75	4.22	4.50	4.00	3.90
3. Dev. contacts with gov't/agency off.	4.29	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.36
4. Plan and conduct VIP/public tours	3.63	3.56	2.50	4.75	3.64
5. Provide/perform as speaker to grps.	3.42	3.33	3.50	4.25	3.44
6. Determine effectiveness of CR plan	3.24	3.22	2.50	3.25	3.21

Note: F value is significant at $P < .05$ -- none in this category

relations skills as significantly less important than did Army National Guard officers ($M = 22.95$) and Corps of Engineers officers ($M = 23.35$).

Analysis of personal, administrative and management, and command information skills groups showed no significant differences in importance by components.

Skill Groups by Primary Categories of Domestic Support

For this analysis, the individual skills questions were again grouped under each of the five skill categories. An analyses of variance of each group of skills by primary category of domestic support was conducted. This identified the relative "importance" the officers involved placed on each skill category.

No significant differences ($P < .05$) were identified (Table 20).

Other Analyses of Variance

Additional analyses of variance produced minimally significant data.

The rank of military officers had no significant impact on how the officers answered the knowledge or skills questions. Rank also did not significantly affect the military officers' determination of the importance of a group of skills.

The grade of Army civilians had minimal influence on how they answered the knowledges and most of the skills

Table 19.
Importance of Skill Groups by Component

Skill Groups	Means by Component					Mean
	Active Duty	Army Res.	Natnl Guard	Corps Engin.	Other	
1. Personal Skills	26.70	26.00	28.05	28.60	28.40	27.80
2. Admin/Mgmt	22.95	22.00	23.23	22.05	25.80	23.01
3. * Media Relations	39.74	36.00	42.36	43.25	43.20	41.79
4. Command Info.	25.65	21.50	24.33	24.60	25.80	24.75
5. **Community Rel.	19.61	22.00	22.95	23.35	22.80	22.15

* F value is significant at $P = .03$

** F value is significant at $P = .02$

Table 20.
Importance of Skill Groups by Primary Categories of Domestic Support

Skill Groups	Means by Category				Mean
	Disaster/Emergency	Law Enf. Support	Enviro. Assist.	Commun. Assist.	
1. Personal Skills	27.54	27.72	24.50	29.25	27.60
2. Admin/Mgmt	22.96	23.50	22.50	21.00	22.97
3. Media Relations	41.75	41.72	42.00	41.00	41.71
4. Command Info.	24.33	22.83	21.00	25.00	23.90
5. Community Rel.	21.27	22.50	19.50	24.25	21.33

Note: F value is significant at $P < .05$ -- no relationships were significant

questions. The sample size of several grades was too small to be significant. The command information skill of "produce(ing) radio broadcasts" was rated with significant difference ($P = .04$) by those in grades GS 12 ($M = 3.18$) and GS 13 ($M = 1.91$). The importance attached to groups of skills was not significantly different by grade.

An analysis of variance by college undergraduate major produced two significant findings ($P < .05$). Officers who majored in a non-communications discipline ($M = 3.88$) attached a greater significance to knowing the "fundamentals of print journalism" than did those who majored in a communications-related discipline ($M = 3.43$). Officers who majored in a non-communications discipline ($M = 3.50$) rated the personal skill of "conduct(ing) public relations evaluation" significantly higher than did those who majored in a communication-related discipline ($M = 3.00$).

Graduate school major had no significant impact on how the officers rated the knowledges and skills questions.

An analysis of formal public affairs training revealed one significant finding ($P = .047$). Officers who attended the "Public Affairs Officer Course - Reserve Component" ($M = 1.67$) rated knowing "how to publish an Army newspaper" significantly less important than those who attended the "Public Affairs Officer Course" ($M = 2.94$) and those who only had training at civilian universities ($M = 2.71$).

Discussion

The information obtained by this survey adds critical information to the body of knowledge available on this subject. No research stands alone. This serves as a comprehensive starting point upon which others may build to develop a more complete reference.

Knowledges

The respondents clearly identified the most important public affairs knowledges Army public affairs officers require to provide public affairs support to Army domestic support operations.

Knowing what the commander expects from public affairs was identified as the most important knowledge a public affairs officer needs for conducting public affairs in support of Army domestic support operations. Public affairs officers work for and represent their commander and command. They do not operate autonomously. Therefore, this knowledge predictably was rated as most important. It is arguably the most important public affairs knowledge in all, not just domestic support, operations.

The second most important knowledge was knowing public issues impacting the mission. Domestic support missions by their nature involve the public--public issues and politics. National Guard public affairs officers placed the highest

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The second most important knowledge was knowing public issues impacting the mission. Domestic support missions by their nature involve the public--public issues and politics. National Guard public affairs officers placed the highest

significance on this because of their inherent intimate contact with the public, public issues and politics. As one National Guard respondent wrote, "The PAOs must understand the politics of the situation." Corps of Engineers public affairs officers routinely interact in the "public" realm and also attached a higher level of importance to this than did active duty Army public affairs officers. However, the active duty officers did not discount this knowledge and rated it above "important," especially when conducting domestic support operations.

Knowing media outlets and their requirements was third in importance. Officers from the different components agreed on the great importance of this knowledge. As the Operations manual implies, effective media relations are essential to the maintenance of public support for Army operations. One respondent wrote, "The PAO must know the local media and how to provide them information in a timely manner; (be) sensitive to media deadlines..." Another added that public affairs officers should have "an established relationship and credibility with local media...also, an understanding of the needs, resources and requirements of media and how to assist them to fulfill their mission."

The knowledge rated fourth in importance was knowing the needs of external publics. This ties into media relations and introduces community relations. A Corps of Engineers

public affairs officer wrote, "(PAOs should know to have) Empathy for personal concerns of affected publics--patience ...". Another mentioned a "Knowledge of psychology..." It also implies the importance of fact-finding and research when involved in a domestic support operation.

Knowing the most useful communications methods for domestic support rated fifth highest. Communication is at the heart of the public affairs mission. Using the most effective methods will produce the best results. During Hurricane Andrew, the Army established "Radio Recovery" to inform the public. Besides media and community relations, internal or command information is introduced in this knowledge. Army newsletters and other methods were used to supply troops and other internal audiences with updates during domestic support operations.

The final knowledge rated above "important" was knowing state and local government emergency relief operations. An active duty officer wrote, "Knowledge of local government operations (is important)..." Another respondent wrote, "PAO must completely understand the emergency response framework and relationships/responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments responding to the emergency."

Knowing the needs of internal publics rated just below "important" as did knowing joint information center operations. The former deals specifically with internal or

command information while the latter introduces the importance of "coordination" and "interaction" among the many public affairs agencies involved. Many open-ended responses stressed the importance of interfacing with other agencies. "Knowledge of the organization and method of operation of a JIB/JIC (Joint Information Bureau/Center) in advance of the operation is essential," wrote one officer. A National Guard officer wrote, "(It is important to know) Joint service techniques, principles (Army/Air Force); working with state civil agencies; staff actions/ procedures."

Knowing federal government emergency relief operations rated ninth. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the primary coordinating agency for federally declared "major disasters" or "emergencies." The agency's Federal Response Plan directs the actions of participating federal agencies. Bureaucratic procedures are usually complex and require great understanding and knowledge. The more "prior" knowledge a public affairs officer has about federal government emergency relief operations the better off he or she will be. A Corps of Engineers public affairs officer wrote of the importance of "Experience in working with FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)."

Information about opinion leaders, clearly a community relations factor, rated tenth. Next came knowing the

fundamentals of print journalism, knowing radio and television broadcast procedures, knowing the fundamentals of electronic journalism, mobile public affairs detachment employment, knowing applicable civil laws, knowing information in the Army public affairs manual and regulations, and principles of communication law related to the First Amendment. These all rated above "average" in importance to public affairs support of Army domestic support operations.

The knowledges rated below "average" importance to these operations included broadcast public affairs detachment employment. Broadcast public affairs detachments are not always deployed to all domestic support operations, and this may have led to their low importance rating. One respondent wrote, "Knowledge of MPAD/BPAD employment was irrelevant in my emergency, but could be very important in a different one."

Likewise, the knowledge of how to publish an Army newspaper also rated low. Public affairs personnel do not routinely publish special Army newspapers during operations of short duration. A National Guard officer wrote, "Because of the (short duration), command information efforts were handled through soldier briefings. This was effective, but a larger emergency would require a newspaper or other such item."

Knowing how to conduct communication research rated last among the twenty knowledge questions. Communication research can be very formal to very informal. Formal research can require much time and money--surveys such as this one. On the other hand, informal research can be as simple as conducting sidewalk "straw" polls or reviewing news media reports. Effective public affairs requires the conduct of continuous communication research in one form or another. Public affairs officers use it to determine public affairs needs and the effectiveness of the public affairs effort. Respondents may have misconstrued this knowledge to mean only formal communication research. Some of the knowledges indicated on the questionnaire and provided in the open-ended responses can only be obtained by conducting communication research.

Skills

The second research question asked: what are the most important public affairs skills Army public affairs officers require to provide public affairs support to Army domestic support operations?

The skills questions were divided into five main categories. As a group, media relations skills were rated as the most important skills a public affairs officer should have to perform public affairs in support of Army domestic support operations. Second came personal skills, then

command information skills, administrative and management skills, and finally community relations skills.

Personal Skills. The skill of coordinating with the commander rated as the highest personal skill. Again, like the most important knowledge question, personal interaction with the commander is a critical key to the "success" or "failure" of the public affairs effort. "No matter how good the PAO or plan, if there isn't command support, public affairs will fail," wrote an active duty officer.

Second was coordinating with the staff. "Coordinate with 'everybody'," wrote one officer. "Interpersonal skills are critical...Developing a team at the start and putting aside parochial attitudes is critical," wrote another respondent.

The third most important personal skill was providing leadership. "Of paramount importance is communication, organization, logistical preparation and resourcing," wrote a National Guard officer. Strong leadership is essential to attaining the objectives.

The remaining personal skills were producing written communication, performing public speaking duties, conducting public relations evaluation and conducting communication research.

Again, conducting evaluation and research were rated at the bottom in importance. Of the well-known public

relations process, research and factfinding is the first step. Evaluating is the last step. The respondents place more importance on the planning and communicating steps. This is unlike the efforts of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company during the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake recovery. PG & E public relations practitioners conducted customer research surveys, focus groups and interviews with employees. Their comprehensive and successful public relations efforts led the Public Relations Society of America to award them the distinguished "Silver Anvil Award."

Administrative and Management Skills. Establishing an information bureau or center was rated as the most important administrative and management skill. The Joint Information Bureau/Center is designed to be the hub of all "joint" public affairs efforts. A well-organized and efficiently operated center is valuable. On the other hand, a poorly organized and operated center can be a public affairs nightmare.

The skill of coordinating with other agencies for support was rated second most important. Conducting a public affairs element deployment was third. Next came conduct resource management and conduct personnel management.

Producing a public affairs operations plan/appendix/annex rated last in this category. Many respondents mentioned the importance of plans but indicated that a lack of time hindered their development or usefulness. "Any one can write a plan, they are amendable," wrote one officer. Another wrote, "PA plans should be designed to be activated when an event occurs..." A National Guard officer wrote, "All public affairs related Standing Operating Procedures (plans) are written and just need execution." "Lack of time when responding to an incident precludes any written plan; even the most rudimentary of plans is ineffective as most situations remain fluid," wrote one respondent.

Media Relations Skills. Media relations skills were rated most important of all skills. The most important media relations skill was handling news media phone queries. In an age of instant communications, public affairs officers have to be equipped to handle the needs of the media. Many now carry around cellular telephones while on location at domestic support operations sites. "Just keeping up with phone calls, media inquiries (during Hurricane Andrew) was a tremendous challenge," wrote one officer. A Corps of Engineers respondent wrote, "(training should) Emphasize telephone techniques and accurate record keeping of all conversations..."

Arranging and conducting press briefings rated second in importance. Arranging and conducting press interviews was third. Next came producing responses to inquiries (questions and answers). These three skills produce a bulk of the public affairs communication output. "One-on-one with reporters is better than throwing news releases at them," wrote a Corps of Engineers public affairs officer.

Performing media escort duties rated fifth. Correcting inaccurate news media reports was next and writing news releases was seventh. An officer involved in the Hurricane Iniki recovery wrote, "a daily (bullet-type) summary was faxed to media ...and became 'the' source document for news organizations, far superior to a standard news release."

The lowest three media relations skills still rated above "average" importance. They are assessing news media issues for public affairs impact, producing a media relations plan, and determining the effectiveness of the media relations plan.

Research, formal planning and evaluation were rated lowest. One officer wrote, "Plans are good--but reality doesn't always match what's in the plan. Flexibility is vital." Another identified his perception by writing, "Officers tend to be reactive and lack issues planning discipline."

One officer summed up media relations by writing:

The most important aspect of Army PA is to help the media do their job. Most reporters know little, have less time, and have no idea what kind of story to do. Be organized: know what's going on, know what the needs of the media are, understand how they work, then give it to them. Make their job easy. Provide story ideas, arrange interviews-- think "visual" and provide whatever they need. The result, a great story that highlights what you want highlighted and earns for instant credibility.

Command Information Skills. The skill of counseling the commander rated most important in the command information category. This is similar to the responses to the most important knowledge and personal skill questions. "An important part of public affairs is educating our leaders," wrote a respondent.

The commander is responsible for his or her command information and the public affairs officer, as an agent for the commander, is responsible to develop and execute the program.

Fact-finding and researching, planning, communicating and evaluating rated second to fifth in this category. Determining the information needs of internal publics involves factfinding. Producing a command information plan

is planning. Producing a newsletter or newspaper is communicating and determining the effectiveness of the command information plan is evaluating. These fall directly in line with the standard public relations process.

Coordinating newspaper distribution, producing radio broadcasts, and producing television broadcasts were rated below "average" importance to public affairs in support of domestic support operations. Although newspapers, radio and television are important in protracted operations, the "duration" factor again may have influenced the ratings.

"Soldiers, commanders and families want to know what 'their guys' are doing. Good command information is a must," wrote one active duty officer.

Community Relations Skills. Community relations skills were rated last among skills. Some officers questioned public affairs responsibilities in this area because Army civil affairs personnel are also involved. "This area ain't clear cut, i.e., G5 (civil affairs) vs. public affairs areas of responsibility," wrote one officer.

The most important community relations skill was developing contacts with government and other agency officials. One respondent wrote, "Prior planning and coordination with likely involved agencies is essential."

The only other skill identified as "important" was developing contacts with opinion leaders. "One-on-one

community relations is extremely important," wrote a Corps of Engineers public affairs officer. Opinion leaders can reach an audience that otherwise may not be exposed to or accept the communicated messages. During disaster operations opinion leaders impact "emergent" norms by their "keynoting" activity.

The remaining community relations skills rated above "average" importance. They include planning and conducting very important person and public tours and providing or performing as a speaker to community groups. One officer wrote, "Establishment of a speaker's bureau and writing speeches are monumental tasks."

The remaining two skills are producing a community relations plan and determining its effectiveness. Respondents again minimized the importance of formal planning and evaluation in the conduct of public affairs support to Army domestic support operations.

Differences by Component

The National Guard is the lead Army agency in many domestic support operations. One respondent wrote, "Most domestic support missions should be the responsibility of the National Guard."

Many of these officers indicated differences between them and the other component officers. "Active forces need to understand reserve forces issues to be able to train and

assist them," wrote one National Guard officer. Another wrote, "The National Guard conducts community service activities a little different from the active Army due to the influence of politics." One officer went into detail about the constitutional relationships between the federal and state forces. "Until the student of domestic actions public affairs has a good working knowledge of these delicate relationships, he has no business practicing public affairs in this area," he concluded. Another was "surprised" that an active duty Army public affairs officer was conducting research in domestic support.

In addition, the National Guard consists of both Army and Air Force elements. State National Guard public affairs officers may be from either service, but represent both services. Therefore, the responses from the Air National Guard public affairs officers were valid for this survey.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also plays a lead role in certain operations--particularly involving public works, engineering, waterways, the environment and disasters. These public affairs officers are primarily Army civilians that are located in offices around the country and not necessarily on Army installations.

Although they are technically a part of the active duty Army, the Corps' 40,000 civilian and 900 military employees could be considered a separate component.

One Corps of Engineers public affairs officer wrote,

Try a marriage of Corps of Engineers public affairs officers and active duty military (public affairs officers), seems to be a complete disconnect between these two bodies, no cross training, or even acknowledgment of the other's capabilities and experiences.

The active duty Army component is continuously involved in environmental and community assistance and primarily plays a supporting role in disasters and law enforcement support.

There are obvious differences in the components and their missions. Many if not most Army public affairs personnel are in the reserve components.

The third research question asked: do Army public affairs officers from the various Army components require different knowledges and skills training emphasis to provide public affairs support to Army domestic support operations?

Knowledges. This research identified five public affairs knowledge questions where members of the different components answered with significant difference.

As mentioned above, knowing public issues impacting the mission was listed significantly less important by active duty officers than most other component officers. The four Air National Guard officers and one State Level 14 public

affairs officer rated this as "very important" (a perfect "5"). Army National Guard officers and Corps of Engineers officers were close behind them. The "environment" in which these officers operate may bias or enlighten them regarding public issues. To them, knowing the public issues that impact the mission is of great concern.

The second knowledge answered differently involves the two Army Reserve officer respondents. This sample size is not sufficient to determine a significant finding, however, they did indicate a greater importance in knowing the needs of external publics than did the other component respondents.

Corps of Engineers and Army National Guard officers attached significantly more importance to knowing information about opinion leaders than did the Air National Guard and State Level 14 officers ("other"). This may have been a result of the small sample size of this category.

Another difference emerged in knowing the fundamentals of print journalism. Corps of Engineers respondents placed more importance on this than did Army National Guard or active duty Army officers. During domestic support operations, Corps of Engineers public affairs officers may be more heavily involved with print journalism than their counterparts or they may be more interested in print journalism. Future research could provide this information.

Finally, Army National Guard officers placed less emphasis on the importance of knowing how to publish an Army newspaper in support of domestic support operations than did active duty Army and Corps of Engineers officers. Active duty officers are accustomed to routinely publishing Army newspapers for their installations. As seen above Corps of Engineers officers place greater importance on the fundamentals of print journalism. Perhaps the "shortness" of most National Guard support operations biased the Army National Guard officers' ratings.

Skills. The officers from the different components basically agreed on the importance of the different personal and administrative and management skills. However, they disagreed on the importance of three media relations skills during domestic support operations.

Corps of Engineers public affairs officers attached significantly greater importance to the skill of writing news releases than did active duty officers or the two Army Reserve officers. Corps of Engineers officers may write more releases themselves as opposed to active duty public affairs officers who usually have a public affairs staff that can write releases.

In addition, the skills of arranging and conducting press interviews and press briefings during domestic support operations were rated significantly more important by Corps

of Engineers and Army National Guard public affairs officers than by active duty and Army Reserve officers. Because most domestic support operations are conducted by the National Guard and Corps of Engineers, these public affairs officers may have more interaction with the news media. Therefore, they may place more importance on these skills.

The command information skill of producing radio broadcasts was rated significantly differently by officers of the different components. Active duty officers rated it above "average" importance during domestic support operations while Army National Guard and Corps of Engineers public affairs officers rated it less than "average" importance. Active duty Army forces usually deploy for large scale disaster relief and recovery operations that last considerably longer than non-disaster National Guard/state level domestic support operations. The Corps of Engineers normally do not employ broadcast elements in the conduct of their mission. Considering this and the necessity of "Radio Recovery" during Hurricane Andrew and other broadcast support in Hawaii, active duty public affairs officers may place more importance on this skill than do the others.

The community relations skill of developing contacts with opinion leaders during domestic support operations was rated significantly higher by Corps of Engineers and Army

National Guard officers than by active duty Army public affairs officers. Again, Corps of Engineers and Army National Guard officers are routinely more intimately involved with their communities. They highly value contacts with opinion leaders and make special use of these contacts during domestic support operations. Active duty Army public affairs officers may be transplanted hundreds or thousands of miles to domestic support operations. They may achieve contact with opinion leaders through other component public affairs officers and therefore may not value this skill as highly.

The officers of the different components provided comparable ratings to all other specific skills. This means that they basically agreed on the importance of the specific public affairs skills during domestic support operations.

Overall, Corps of Engineers and Army National Guard public affairs officers rated media relations and community relations skills significantly more important during domestic support operations than did active duty Army public affairs officers.

Active duty officers placed slightly more importance on command information skills and slightly less importance on personal skills during domestic support operations than did Corps of Engineers and Army National Guard public affairs officers.

These findings may be a reflection of the general nature of each component, their varying missions and operating procedures, and the "mindset" created in the public affairs officers by their environment.

Conclusion. The answer to the third research question is no and yes.

Basically, all Army public affairs officers require the same foundational knowledges and skills. However, this research identified differences in emphasis by components among knowledges and skills. Ideally, training should be tailored to recognize the many differences among the components while promoting understanding and interoperability. It should focus on the knowledges and skills public affairs officers from each component deem most important to their components' public affairs support of Army domestic support operations.

Public affairs officers from each component must provide their component's most effective public affairs support while understanding the needs and differences of the other components. Total Army public affairs can be truly successful in support of Army domestic support operations when these differences are recognized, understood and positively integrated as an asset rather than a liability. Army public affairs training should focus on this.

Differences by Operations

The fourth research question asked: do Army public affairs officers require different public affairs knowledges and skills to provide public affairs support to each of the four primary categories of domestic support operations?

Disparity in sample size for each of the four primary categories limited the significance of this analysis. The categories include disaster and domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, environmental assistance, and community assistance. Future research could focus on these four categories and attempt to find balanced samples.

Environmental and community assistance are more nebulous than are disaster and law enforcement support. They are more routine, ongoing and harder to define. One active duty public affairs officer wrote,

Domestic support for major missions...is no challenge to the PAO...'Day to day' business is the challenge....community requests for equipment support...the domestic support missions only give us the opportunity to excel by promoting what we are doing to help.

Most Army public affairs officers have been involved in community assistance operations. However, the respondents chose to focus their answers on the "major" domestic support operations. The sample size in this category was small.

Army public affairs in environmental matters is quickly becoming a public affairs specialty. Some Army environmental public affairs officers work directly for "environment" directorates and not for the public affairs office. To obtain an adequate sample of these officers would have been beyond the scope of this research.

Significant samples were obtained for officers involved in disaster and law enforcement support.

Knowledges. Significant differences were identified in knowing federal government emergency relief operations. Public affairs officers involved in disasters attached significantly more importance to this than did those involved in the other three categories. Disaster relief operations usually involve numerous agencies and become complex. Knowledge of relief operations becomes critical. When the Federal Emergency Management Agency becomes involved, the Federal Response Plan takes effect. One officer wrote, "understanding of 'systems' is most important."

Law enforcement support also can be complex but apparently knowing federal guidelines is less important to Army public affairs officers. Army support comes under the purview of a law enforcement agency. This agency may provide all the information on federal emergency operations Army public affairs officers need.

Officers involved in law enforcement support placed significantly more importance on knowing joint information center operations than did those in the other three categories. Law enforcement support operations often involve numerous government agencies. Public affairs officers must speak with one voice. The joint information center promotes this concept. Apparently, it is more critical to coordinate public affairs during law enforcement support than it is during disasters and other domestic support operations.

Knowing the fundamentals of print journalism and how to publish an Army newspaper were also rated with significant difference. The officers involved in disaster support rated both as more important than did those involved in law enforcement support. The nature and duration of the different support missions may support or preclude publishing an Army newspaper or considering the fundamentals of print journalism. Both are more likely to happen during long-term disaster relief and recovery efforts than during law enforcement support operations.

The two officers involved in environmental assistance operations significantly discounted knowing radio and television procedures compared to those involved in community assistance and disaster support. Although environmental assistance is important, it may not lend

itself to broadcast coverage as would community assistance and disaster support operations.

Skills. The two officers involved in environmental assistance operations also placed a higher premium on the skill of conducting public relations evaluation than did those in the other categories. Measuring the effects of public affairs efforts during environmental operations may be more important than during other operations.

The administrative and management skill of producing a public affairs operations plan/appendix/annex was significantly more important to officers involved in law enforcement support than to the others. These operations may be more predictable than disaster operations. One officer wrote, "A PAO response plan is only as good as the last disaster and must be constantly adjusted with the times and situation."

Apparently, careful planning and controlled execution are more critical in public affairs support to law enforcement operations than to other Army domestic support operations.

The two officers involved in environmental assistance discounted the importance of producing a media relations plan for domestic support operations compared to all other officers. Planning media relations may not be as important during environmental assistance as during other operations.

The officers who were involved in the different primary categories of domestic support provided similar ratings to all other specific skills.

An analysis of the ratings the officers gave to the skill groups revealed that the type of primary domestic support operation did not have a significant impact upon the importance given to the skill group. In all categories, media relations skills were considered the most important and community relations skills the least important. Officers involved in law enforcement support and environmental assistance rated administrative and management skills slightly more important than command information skills. This highlights the complex "administrative" nature of these two types of operations. The other two categories of respondents rated command information skills more important than administrative and management skills.

Conclusion. Without a sufficient sample in each category, it is difficult to draw a substantive conclusion to the fourth research question.

Based upon this research, Army public affairs officers basically require the same public affairs knowledges and skills regardless of their involvement in different types of domestic support operations. This research has identified some knowledges and skills that vary in importance among the operations.

This research has also identified the differences in importance members of the Army components place on knowledges and skills.

The officers from the various components roughly agreed on the importance rating of most knowledges. They significantly differed on the importance of public issues impacting the mission, information about opinion leaders, fundamentals of print journalism, and how to publish an Army newspaper. Corps of Engineers officers routinely rated these more important than officers of the other Army components. Army National Guard officers gave more importance to external issues and publics while active duty Army officers put more importance on Army newspapers.

Regardless of component, the respondents basically agreed on the importance of most skills. They significantly differed on three media relations skills. Corps of Engineers officers placed significantly more emphasis on writing news releases and arranging and conducting press interviews and briefings than did active duty Army officers.

Active duty Army officers placed significantly more emphasis on producing radio broadcasts than did officers from the other components and significantly less importance on developing contacts with opinion leaders.

Overall, of the three major components represented, active duty Army officers placed the most importance on

command information skills and the least importance on media relations and community relations skills. Corps of Engineers and Army National Guard officers placed the most importance on media relations and community relations skills.

This research has also identified the differences in importance officers involved in the primary categories of domestic support operations place on knowledges and skills.

The officers basically agreed on the importance ratings of knowledges and skills. However, officers involved in disaster or domestic emergencies attached significantly more importance to knowing federal government emergency relief operations, fundamentals of print journalism, and how to publish an Army newspaper than did those involved in law enforcement support.

Officers involved in law enforcement support placed significantly more importance on knowing joint information center operations and the skill of producing a public affairs operations plan than did those involved in disaster or domestic emergencies.

These are the basic findings. They provide a starting point for training developers and other researchers. Many other useful and insightful comments are provided in Appendix C, Open-ended Responses.

The scope of this research centered on Army public affairs commissioned military officers and equivalent Army civilians. A survey of Army noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and lower ranking civilian public affairs personnel may provide further insight and help in the development and evaluation of their training.

Army public affairs officers often operate in a "joint" environment. A survey of other service public affairs officers will produce a broader body of knowledge on this topic. Likewise, a survey of other government and civilian agency public affairs officers will be useful.

In conclusion, Army public affairs training must be flexible and adapt to the changes in the Army mission. Reality-based training can only come about as a result of continually tapping into the experience of public affairs practitioners through reality-based research.

Appendix A, Cover Letter

CPT ROGER G. MEYER
(Return Address and Date)

Major Thomas E. Smith
ZZ National Guard, Armory Drive
Smithville, ZZ 00010

Dear Major Smith:

I am an active-duty U.S. Army officer enrolled at Marshall University to pursue a graduate degree related to public affairs.

The Army requires me to complete a thesis. My thesis will answer the question: what are the most critical public affairs skills and knowledge that public affairs officers require to accomplish domestic support missions. These missions include disaster relief, counter drug initiatives, civil disturbances, education support, health care, search and rescue, and other support to civil authorities and communities.

I need your help to obtain this information. Your experience in performing public affairs in domestic support missions is valuable to the Total Army.

Please take a few minutes to fill out the attached questionnaire. Consider the importance of each knowledge or skill individually and in relation to the others. It should take no more than 20 minutes. I will keep your response anonymous. Return it (survey only) in the stamped, preaddressed envelope by 23 July.

Once the research is complete, I envision that the Army and the Defense Information School will use the information to evaluate and possibly redesign their "Public Affairs -- Civil Preparedness" classes. We can only provide realistic training if we identify skills and knowledge that Army PAOs really need.

Your timely response is necessary to the successful completion of this thesis. Please mail it back by 23 July. Thank you for your time and assistance.

Sincerely,

Roger G. Meyer
Captain, U.S. Army
Graduate Student

Appendix B, Questionnaire

PUBLIC AFFAIRS KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS REQUIRED
TO PERFORM DOMESTIC SUPPORT MISSIONS

Instructions: Please consider your involvement in a domestic support mission that had the most Public Affairs training/ experience value. List the domestic support mission's name, its type, date, and your job title:

Use the following code to indicate the importance of a particular knowledge or skill while you were involved in the mission. Consider their importance individually and in relation to one another. Circle only one response per question.

--- Very	-----	Little	-----	Not	----
Important	Important	Average	Importance	Important	
5	4	3	2	1	

PART ONE: KNOWLEDGE - The fact or condition of being aware of something; act or state of understanding; practical skill, or familiarity gained by actual experience; something that is or may be known.

In reference to public affairs (PA) knowledge, how important was knowledge of the following to accomplishing domestic support?

1. Federal government emergency relief operations	5	4	3	2	1
2. State and local govt. emergency relief operations	5	4	3	2	1
3. Joint information center opns.	5	4	3	2	1
4. Info. in Army PA manual/regs.	5	4	3	2	1
5. What the CDR expects from PA	5	4	3	2	1
6. Principles of communication law related to First Amendment	5	4	3	2	1
7. Applicable civil laws	5	4	3	2	1
8. Public issues impacting mission	5	4	3	2	1

PLEASE CONTINUE ON THE REVERSE SIDE

Appendix B, Questionnaire

	Very Important 5	Important 4	Average 3	Little Importance 2	Not Important 1
9. Mobile PA detachment employment	5	4	3	2	1
10. Broadcast PA detach. employment	5	4	3	2	1
11. How to conduct comm. research	5	4	3	2	1
12. Needs of internal publics	5	4	3	2	1
13. Needs of external publics	5	4	3	2	1
14. Information about opinion ldrs	5	4	3	2	1
15. Media outlets and requirements	5	4	3	2	1
16. The most useful communication methods for domestic support	5	4	3	2	1
17. Fundamentals of print journalism	5	4	3	2	1
18. How to publish an Army newspaper	5	4	3	2	1
19. Fundamentals/elect. journalism	5	4	3	2	1
20. Radio and TV broadcast proced.	5	4	3	2	1

If you have any additional PA officer level knowledge you consider important or very important to the domestic support mission, please list it here:

PART TWO: SKILLS - The acquired and developed ability to perform a compilation of individual tasks to a refined level of competence; a learned power of doing something competently; the ability to use one's knowledge effectively; technical proficiency.

In reference to public affairs skills, how important were the following abilities to accomplishing the domestic support mission?

Appendix B, Questionnaire

Very Important 5	Important 4	Average 3	Little Importance 2	Not Important 1
------------------------	----------------	--------------	---------------------------	-----------------------

Personal Skills:

1. Provide leadership	5	4	3	2	1
2. Produce written communication	5	4	3	2	1
3. Perform public speaking duties	5	4	3	2	1
4. Conduct communication research	5	4	3	2	1
5. Conduct public rel. evaluation	5	4	3	2	1
6. Coordinate with staff	5	4	3	2	1
7. Coordinate with commander	5	4	3	2	1

Administrative and Management Skills:

1. Produce a public affairs operations plan/appendix/annex	5	4	3	2	1
2. Conduct personnel management	5	4	3	2	1
3. Conduct resource management	5	4	3	2	1
4. Coordinate with other agencies for personnel and logistic support	5	4	3	2	1
5. Conduct a PA element deployment	5	4	3	2	1
6. Establish an info. bureau/center	5	4	3	2	1

Media Relations (MR) Skills:

1. Produce a media relations plan	5	4	3	2	1
2. Perform media escort duties	5	4	3	2	1
3. Handle news media phone queries	5	4	3	2	1
4. Write news releases	5	4	3	2	1

PLEASE CONTINUE ON THE REVERSE SIDE

Appendix B, Questionnaire

--- Very ---		Little ---		Not ---	
Important	Important	Average	Importance	Important	
5	4	3	2	1	

5.	Arrange/conduct press interviews	5	4	3	2 1
6.	Arrange/conduct press briefings	5	4	3	2 1
7.	Correct inaccurate media reports	5	4	3	2 1
8.	Assess media issues for PA impact	5	4	3	2 1
9.	Produce responses to actual or anticipated inquiries (Q&As)	5	4	3	2 1
10.	Determine effectiveness of MR plan/initiatives	5	4	3	2 1
Command Information (CI) Skills:					
1.	Produce a command info. plan	5	4	3	2 1
2.	Produce a newsletter/newspaper	5	4	3	2 1
3.	Produce radio broadcasts	5	4	3	2 1
4.	Produce TV broadcasts	5	4	3	2 1
5.	Counsel commanders on CI methods	5	4	3	2 1
6.	Coordinate newspaper distribution	5	4	3	2 1
7.	Determine information needs of internal publics	5	4	3	2 1
8.	Determine effectiveness of CI plan/initiatives	5	4	3	2 1
Community Relations (CR) Skills:					
1.	Produce a community rel. plan	5	4	3	2 1
2.	Develop contacts w/ opinion ldrs	5	4	3	2 1
3.	Develop contacts with government and other agency officials	5	4	3	2 1
4.	Plan and conduct VIP/public tours	5	4	3	2 1

Appendix B, Questionnaire

----- Very -----		Little -----		Not -----			
Important	Important	Average	Importance	Important			
5	4	3	2	1			

5.	Provide or perform duty as a speaker to a community group		5	4	3	2	1
6.	Determine effectiveness of CR plan/initiatives		5	4	3	2	1

If you have any additional PA officer level skills you consider important or very important to the domestic support mission, please list them here:

PART THREE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your component? (CIRCLE ONE)

- | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Active Duty Army | 3. Army Natn'l Guard | 5. Other
(specify) |
| 2. Army Reserve | 4. Army Corp/Engineers | |
-

2. Military personnel only: what rank were you when you were involved in the domestic support mission?

- | | | |
|------------|--------|--------------------|
| 1. 2LT/1LT | 3. MAJ | 5. COL |
| 2. CPT | 4. LTC | 6. Other (specify) |

3. Civilian personnel only: what civil service grade were you when you were involved in the domestic support mission?

- | | | |
|--------------|-------------|--------------------|
| 1. GS 4 to 7 | 3. GS 10/11 | 5. GS/M 13 |
| 2. GS 8/9 | 4. GS 12 | 6. Other (specify) |

4. What was your undergraduate major in college?

PLEASE CONTINUE ON THE REVERSE SIDE

Appendix B, Questionnaire

5. If you have a graduate degree, indicate degree and major:

6. Before deploying to the domestic support mission, what was the highest level of public affairs training you attended?

7. What other domestic support missions have you been involved in? Please identify names/types/dates and what your titles and jobs were.

Do you have additional comments regarding Army public affairs and domestic support missions that would be useful to this research?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP, PLEASE MAIL THIS BACK TODAY
(Return Address Provided)

Appendix C, Open-ended Responses

1. Additional public affairs officer level knowledge considered important or very important to the domestic support mission:

U.S. Army Active Duty:

- o Need to know how to get Army, Department of Defense and Joint Staff support for public affairs operations.
- o Political systems, roles and responsibilities of federal agencies, and strategy development.
- o Congressional relations; fundamentals of military "standards of conduct;" intergovernmental relations (within DoD and external); cultural sensitivities among ethnic groups; civil affairs.
- o Interfacing with FEMA, once a presidential disaster declaration unleashes that agency into what may have been a reasonably stable operation. Being able to subordinate service needs to the mission at hand; realizing that we are not aware of local political nuances. What seems "mission correct" may be "politically incorrect."
- o Knowledge of local government operations and FEMA's Federal Response Plan.
- o Even if Army involvement is limited to a small supporting role, there will be a high level of media interest. Close coordination with law enforcement agency spokespersons is

Appendix C, Open-ended Responses

critical. Always keep your commander informed about PA issues related to operational developments.

- o Very important--local knowledge. Names of people, places, pronunciation of local names/words, and local geography, road networks, radio broadcast capabilities.
- o How to write an operations order; how to coordinate on a corps and joint staff; irrelevant how Mobile PA Detachment is supposed to be used.
- o Knowledge of the organization and method of operation of a JIB/JIC in advance of the operation is essential.
- o Very important to understand command relationships and chain of command.
- o Keep chain of command informed; analyze actions and events for PA impact.
- o Very little time in my DINFOS class was allocated to explaining what assets are available to a PAO and what their capabilities are. Equipment needs to be standardized. All PATs and PADs are not compatible.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:

- o Experience in working with FEMA
 - o Application of federal law as it applies to state law when proving support on a humanitarian mission.
- Specifically, enforcement roles in the eventuality of civil

Appendix C, Open-ended Responses

disturbance rioting, looting, etc.

- o Knowledge of the community and of environmental laws.
- o Knowledge of psychology, use of language, colors/shapes, appropriate medium, etc.; not counseling.
- o Empathy for personal concerns of affected publics--patience; insatiable curiosity; willingness/ability to learn technical language and concepts and then translate/communicate them; ability to work under stress with shifting priorities and deadlines.
- o PA officers need resources--people and money to accomplish mission requirements. Officers tend to be reactive and lack issues planning discipline.
- o Involvement in professional societies (i.e. Public Relations Society of America, etc.).

National Guard:

- o The PAO must understand the politics of the situation.
- o PAOs responding to domestic emergencies must have a far-reaching knowledge of his/her own organizations mission(s) and capabilities. PAO must completely understand the emergency response framework and relationships/responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments responding to the emergency.

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- o PAO knows all aspects of the mission at hand and what the joint task force is doing.
- o How the National Guard Bureau and the Department of the Army manage PA efforts.
- o Familiarity with other state agencies communicators and governors office, communications office.
- o Knowledge of how to work a shrinking resource system to obtain the supplies and equipment to accomplish the mission; points of contact with the governor's office, media outlets, major Army commands in state NG, closest active duty PAO, Office of Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Operations Center.
- o Joint service techniques, principles (Army/Air Force); working with state civil agencies; staff actions/procedures.
- o Joint Information Center interaction; coordination between PAOs from various participating agencies; "systematize" processing of media to facilitate planning and predictability for all media/PA.
- o There are three distinct phases to domestic emergencies with varying degrees of public affairs sensitivities and media requirements: Pre-Deployment (Mobilization) Phase, Employment Phase, Recovery Phase. Different types and levels of PA training/experience are required for each phase depending upon the category of domestic emergency (i.e.

Appendix C, Open-ended Responses

civil disturbance, natural disaster). It's very important that PA personnel become proficient in all phases of responsibility to maintain integrity and professionalism of operation from start to finish. Whatever phase the PAO fails in is what the organization (and government's response) will be remembered for.

- o PAO must know the local media and how to provide them information in a timely manner; must be sensitive to media deadlines; must also be sensitive to the political climate.
- o Information and an established relationship and credibility with local media. Also an understanding of the needs, resources and requirements of media and how to assist them to fulfill their mission.
- o Work experience in the civilian media.
- o Emergency situations in particular require that the PAO be prepared for external media. News media representatives can overwhelm the PAO. The PAO must know how to get out ahead of them whether the event is good news or bad news.
- o Take the local media with you and feed them the stories that you want to see aired.
- o I have found that it is very important for the site personnel to be briefed on PA requirements and a protocol established. The media do not always stick to what the PAO says--they want to talk to someone on site....ideally all

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personnel involved in an action should receive a PA briefing and coached on "sensitive responses" if necessary.

- o Domestic support missions vary greatly. Some are proactive (health care, counter drug) and some are reactive (natural disaster, search and rescue). You must insure that your PA activity qualifies as "serious" news. If you try and create a mountain of PA coverage for a minor story then you damage your reputation and reduce your effectiveness.

- o Get the news people as many quotes from enlisted personnel as possible. Officer quotes appear to be self-serving; look for sidebars for the news people.

Example--in our 1992 floods, fire ants and our soldiers were good items and a variation on the overall theme.

- o Press conference procedures.

- o PAO must know regulations regarding helicopter airlift of media and government officials; serve as the "approver" of such flights for the commander.

- o Knowledge of media airlift procedures is critical and having a good working relationship with higher commands and the media as well.

- o Photography, prepare briefing slides

- o Having been one of three Army National Guard officers tapped to set up Los Angeles County's first Joint Information Center in preparation for Rodney King Trial II,

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I cannot stress enough the need for a "PAO Forward" element in the epicenter of the afflicted area with ALL other worker-bee PA assets (deployed out with the troops to handle P.I./C.I./M.R.) Task Force organized under the Senior PAO at the PA forward Joint Information Center.

o Knowledge of federal emergency operations are irrelevant in state emergencies unless federal support is provided. Even then, unless federalized the National Guard is a state asset. Knowledge of MPAD/BPAD employment was irrelevant in my emergency, but could be very important in a different one.

2. Additional PA officer level skills considered important or very important to the domestic support mission:

U.S. Army Active Duty:

o ...no matter how good the PAO or plan, if there isn't command support PA will fail. An important part of PA is educating our leaders.

o Any one can write a plan, they are amendable.

Concentrate on in the field skills. Coordinate with "everybody." Soldiers, commanders and families want to know what "their guys" are doing. Good CI is a must. Good MR also--unfortunately my experience is that no guidance will

Appendix C, Open-ended Responses

come early and then it will be vague.

- o Be articulate--both orally and in writing.
- o Desktop publishing skills--enlisted personnel are not always available. Examples, the daily summary was faxed to media daily and became "the" source document for news organizations, far superior to a standard news release. One paper in the wrapup of all activities.
- o Establishment of a speaker's bureau and writing speeches are monumental tasks. The PAO himself will be looked to by the staff and command group as the expert. More often than not you'll be the only person who can write speeches in the office. This can be a great burden as few understand it takes more than one day to prepare a good speech.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:

- o Briefing skills (not just media briefings).
- o Ability to do three things--not necessarily related to each other--at the same time.

National Guard:

- o Prior coordination with other agencies involved is essential. Also, PA plans should be designed to be activated when an event occurs, not when the commander nods his head. This requires prior approval by the commander--

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it will eliminate the limbo that has to occur when the man has his hands full of operational problems.

- o All public affairs related Standing Operating Procedures are written and just need execution.

- o Force your way into all the pre-deployment briefings or you will be too ignorant to do your job. Nobody willingly shares information. The PAO is the last person considered in the distribution of information and resources.

- o Interpersonal skills are critical when dealing with the various personalities and organizational idiosyncrasies associated with a joint operation. Developing a team at the start and putting aside parochial attitudes is critical.

- o Manage public affairs personnel and resources to provide the most Command Information documentation possible in the affected areas. Of paramount importance is communication, organization, logistical preparation and resourcing.

- o Training Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPARs) is critically important in the reserve component--but no money is available for this vital function. Too much pressure on state PAO in large states to "be all things to all people" across the broad spectrum of potential high profile issues: gays in military, environment, downsizing, domestic support missions, ODT, going to war, etc.

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- o PAO must have a keen sense of public sensitivities, anticipate sensitivity of actions taken by one's organization, and be fully integrated into the management team of the organization to relay PA concerns effectively.
- o What is of primary importance is developing a concise relationship with the news media, establishing clear and uncomplicated rules for media access and ensuring that PA personnel are trained and equipped to perform the media escort mission.
- o Very important to create and maintain strong relationships with local media. I only call them when I have a "quality" opportunity that I can facilitate for them (using aircraft, good story--local angle); always tell the truth--your reputation is based on it; break bad news yourself with empathy and a minimum of two positive physical actions taking place to fix the problem.

3. Additional comments:

U.S. Army Active Duty/Army Reserve:

- o (There is a) big need to coordinate with FEMA and state civil defense (or state relief organizations).
- o Prior planning and coordination with likely involved agencies is essential.

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- o Common sense and understanding of "systems" is most important. Lack of time when responding to an incident precludes any written plan; even the most rudimentary of plans is ineffective as most situations remain fluid.
- o Have total access to the commander; activate a Press Camp Headquarters, three MPADs, and one BPAD within 24 hours of federal involvement.
- o We in public affairs need to continue to educate commanders and leaders on the importance of PA. If they want coverage, they must be willing to give up space to accommodate news media representatives and become aggressive salespersons about the Army and their soldiers' performance.
- o Public Affairs personnel are too internally focused. In a domestic support mission, 95 percent of the focus should be outward. The problem (stems from) our training and "experience" (that) is also internally oriented. Army PA personnel need to focus on "joint" training and exercises.
- o We found that during Hurricane Iniki, the radio and television media preferred bullet-type updates faxed to their stations versus the traditional Army press releases.
- o Doctrinally, domestic action support is a bit fuzzy in peacetime. G5 (Civil/Military Affairs) is lead agency here...and when I was PAO of (another) division. The tightest link is between G5 and community relations.

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o This area ain't clear cut, i.e., G5 vs. PAO areas of responsibility. Also, I have already seen signs of significant cut-backs in domestic action support due to budget cuts. Another area of concern is the frequent difficulty of determining whether we are violating regulations (such as)...(we) can't compete with civilian vendors, e.g. food service equipment. But, if choice is not Army or civil vendor, but rather Army or nothing (i.e. requester can't afford to rent equipment), are we really in... competition? Also, we can't support every request. if we support one request from "X" but deny an almost identical request from "Y" how do we avoid at least a perception of selective benefit?

o Virtually none of the formal training in PA currently taught at DINFOS or even the Joint Public Affairs Officers Course deals with civil issues. Civil affairs officers (mostly Army Reserve officers) are in a far better position to deal successfully with domestic missions. The "take the hill" mission mentality serves us not at all well in domestic missions. Too many Americans question our motives without that mentality. We must be able to empathize convincingly with the victims in the scenario; unfortunately our training does not facilitate that condition.

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- o There is a fine distinction between PSYOPS and public affairs; however PSYOPS has the broadcast equipment to get information to the audience (i.e., radio stations, loudspeakers, etc.). We must be careful in public affairs when we use these resources because the media is quick to pick up on the idea that we are "PSYOPing our audience."
- o Domestic support for major missions such as Hurricane Andrew relief and search and rescue operations is no challenge to the PAO. It's a dream come true. "Day to day" business is the challenge. Media queries on accidents, deaths, shootings, rape, and those that come from disgruntled family members who inform the media of the latest post rumors are the focus for public affairs. Then there are community requests for equipment support, for soldier support in parades etc. and how to deal with the public when you tell them "you can't help or provide support." I could go on, but the domestic support missions only give us the opportunity to excel by promoting what we are doing to help. It's no challenge for the PAO.
- o I believe the Army is squared away for these type of operations. FEMA, on the other hand, is a mess.

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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:

- o The most important quality to possess in going into a disaster relief type situation is an ability to respond rapidly to different and changing conditions. Bureaucratic procedures often do not apply and are even counterproductive.
- o The more emergency PA training you get the better off you are. Plan ahead--no time to plan in an emergency. One-on-one community relations is extremely important. One-on-one with reporters is better than throwing news releases at them.
- o Try a marriage of Corps of Engineers PAO and active duty military. (There) seems to be a complete disconnect between these two bodies, no cross training, or even acknowledgment of the others capabilities and experiences.
- o It is very possible that Army PAO responsibilities in this area will grow in importance. As a civilian PAO, I have always been concerned about knowledge and background and credibility with my green suit counterparts. As a result, I have taken (numerous Army/Reserve military officer courses)...
- o Emphasize telephone techniques and accurate record keeping of all conversations (to cover yourself).
- o Pre-plan required clothing and equipment.

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National Guard:

- o Most domestic support missions should be the responsibility of the National Guard!!
- o Active forces need to understand reserve forces issues to be able to train and assist them.
- o The National Guard conducts community service activities (domestic support missions) a little different from the active Army due to the influence of politics.
- o (What is needed) A careful study of the Constitution and the relationship of the independent state militias, National Guard of the United States and the federal Army; a study of the constitutional relationships between the Guard and federal Army and subsequent legislation; a study of the Posse Comitatus Act and how it is intended to restrain federal authorities from enforcing state or federal laws. Until the student of domestic actions PA has a good working knowledge of these delicate relationships, he has no business practicing PA in this area.
- o After a half dozen DINFOS courses and years in PA, I am surprised you are doing this kind of research. This domestic support business was never mentioned at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Frankly, our commanders have not placed PA activities as a priority in domestic actions. What has been done, we have done more or less on our own.

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o It is extremely important to remember that we in the military are in support of civil authorities during domestic missions and should conduct our PA effort accordingly.

There is no substitute for actual field experience. Each action this office has been involved with was unique in facilities available and how PA assets were employed.

o It is important, in most instances, to understand that the military role is "in support of civil authority." This requires extensive coordination with domestic leaders and demands restraint by the military PAO when dealing with the media so as not to overshadow civilian leadership. The crucial aspect of the PA mission is in developing the response plan, managing PA resources, and executing the plan in concert with the local, state or regional agencies involved.

o Every domestic situation is different, as is every war. A PAO response plan is only as good as the last disaster and must be constantly adjusted with the times and situation. The ability to work well with representative from other services/government agencies is vital to the success of any response operation.

o Plans are good--but reality doesn't always match what's in the plan. Flexibility is vital. Media relations is the most important aspect.

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- o Joint service aspects and multi-agency considerations are important in civil/disaster actions.
- o A proactive agenda is the key to success!
- o See Fort Leavenworth's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) booklet, Media and the Tactical Commander. Many of the South West Asia lessons learned have good parallel applications to domestic/crisis deployments.
- o Forces Command I Opener is an excellent publication and the new FM 46-1 is good too. My biggest concern is manpower authorizations in the National Guard. States are authorized only ONE federal technician (GS12). This is grossly inadequate to handle our full plate of challenges, especially in (our state)...
- o When National Guard units are called to state duty, the governor authorizes a certain number of soldiers to be brought to duty. Other units are not available as they are on active duty. Guard management considers public affairs "overhead." During the...period covered by (this event), I was the only PAO on duty...an entire Public Affairs Detachment was needed. Because of the (short duration), command information efforts were handled through soldier briefings. This was effective, but a larger emergency would require a newspaper or other such items. Community relations follow-up was critical and extended for a number of months.

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- o State PA offices are understaffed. Each state has one (1) PAO assigned full time. There are no clerical or administrative personnel assigned. This placing of PA on a substandard level with other directorates is a blue-print for disaster.
- o (There is) never enough support and assistance when something happens. In PA, things happen quickly with some follow-up.
- o MPADs (Mobile Public Affairs Detachments) in the Army Guard and Army Reserves have many highly qualified and highly motivated media professionals--they need to be used!
- o Public affairs needs to be considered when resourcing communications equipment and vehicles. Both are crucial to success of PA, neither are organic. PA needs to be proactive in establishing points of contact within media and other governmental agencies. During a crisis is not the time to try to learn who the decision makers and public affairs personnel are. That contact and rapport needs to already exist.
- o With few resources and the suddenness with which these missions occur, public affairs in the National Guard moves quickly. It is hard to say what knowledge and skills come first. I suspect knowledge of the unit's mission and capability comes first, and then an understanding of how the

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National Guard gets involved in local disasters. Media relations comes next; for the Guard the media is a primary command information channel, given that Guard members are pretty widely dispersed throughout an area with a 50-mile radius (for the District, this is true); other states have a wider area.

o I would stress the media relations aspect of the job; media escort. The broadcast journalist's role becomes secondary in an operation the magnitude of Hurricane Andrew. Just keeping up with phone calls, media inquiries was a tremendous challenge. PA support needs to be deployed forward certainly, but competent PA support must remain at home station as well.

o Media relations, external audience relations, and good open working relationships within the PAO's command are essential to mission accomplishment. PAO must establish and maintain internal and external professional credibility at all times!

o Domestic support missions are "good" news. Often the story tells itself. The most important aspect of Army PA is to help the media do their job. Most reporters know little, have less time, and have no idea what kind of story to do. Be organized: know what's going on, know what the needs of the media are, understand how they work, then give it to

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them. Make their job easy. Provide story ideas, arrange interviews--think "visual" and provide whatever they need. The result, a great story that highlights what you want highlighted and earns for instant credibility. This comes in handy next time when perhaps the story or event isn't a good one.

o I believe the best PAOs are operators first and PAOs second. If a PAO knows tactics, operations and military strategy, then he or she can operate with a great deal of confidence and autonomy. Tactical commanders are far more eager to share with a fellow tactically oriented soldier than a straight PA officer providing "numbers." If you have "been there, done that" and are still willing to learn, then you are a true professional! If you are short on experience, then you must gain knowledge of operations ASAP. It allows for a certain comfort level in a scenario that is constantly changing.

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